پژوهش های روابط بین الملل

پژوهش های روابط بین الملل

مدل «حاکمیت فناورانه محدود» : تبیین سازگاری اجباری کره جنوبی در بخش تراشه‌ها

نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان
1 نویسنده مسئول، دانشیار روابط بین‌الملل، گروه علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه شهید باهنر کرمان، ایران، abbaszadeh@uk.ac.ir
2 دانش‌آموخته کارشناسی ارشد دیپلماسی و سازمان‌های بین‌المللی، گروه علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه شهید باهنر کرمان، ایران، m.rostami@uk.ac.ir
10.22034/irr.2026.573124.2824
چکیده
در گذار نظم بین‌الملل از وابستگی متقابل لیبرال به «ژئواکونومیک اجباری»، ابزاری‌سازی زنجیره‌های تأمین نیمه‌هادی، کارآمدی استراتژی‌های سنتی قدرت‌های میانی نظیر «موازنه» را به چالش کشیده است. پژوهش حاضر با تمرکز بر پارادوکس ساختاری کره جنوبی، به دنبال پاسخ به این پرسش است که چرا سئول علی‌رغم هزینه‌های گزاف اقتصادی، ناگزیر به همسویی کامل با ایالات متحده شده است؟ این مقاله با معرفی مفهوم نوآورانه «حاکمیت فناورانه محدود»، استدلال می‌کند که برخورداری از «توانمندی تولیدی» بدون کنترل بر «فناوری‌های بالادستی انحصاری» (مانند تجهیزات و نرم‌افزارهای آمریکایی)، عاملیت راهبردی قدرت‌های میانی را سلب می‌کند. با بهره‌گیری از روش‌شناسی رهگیری علّی فرایندها، این پژوهش مکانیسم انتقال فشار از کنترل‌های صادراتی ۲۰۲۲ آمریکا به اقتصاد سیاسی داخلی کره را ردیابی کرده و نشان می‌دهد که چگونه سئول از راهبرد موازنه به مدل رفتاری «سازگاری اجباری» تغییر جهت داده است؛ وضعیتی که در آن بازیگر، زیان‌های اقتصادی قطعی (سقوط ۷۸.۱ درصدی سرمایه‌گذاری در چین) را برای دفع ریسک‌های وجودی فناورانه می‌پذیرد. یافته‌های پژوهش حاکی از آن است که «حاکمیت فناورانه محدود» یک استثنا نیست، بلکه به‌عنوان یک لنز تحلیلی جدید، قابلیت تبیین رفتار سایر قدرت‌های «تکنو - صنعتی» نظیر هلند و ژاپن را در نظم دوقطبی جدید داراست.
کلیدواژه‌ها

عنوان مقاله English

The "Limited Technological Sovereignty" Model: Explaining South Korea's Coercive Adaptation in the Chip Sector

نویسندگان English

Mehdi Abbaszadeh Fathabadi 1
Mosayyeb Rostami Khanmakani 2
1 Corresponding Author, Associate Professor in International Relations, Department of Political Science, Shahid Bahonar University of Kerman, Kerman, Iran, abbaszadeh@uk.ac.ir
2 Master of Arts in Political Science, Department of Political Science, Shahid Bahonar University of Kerman, Kerman, Iran. m.rostami@uk.ac.ir
چکیده English

In the transition of the international order from liberal interdependence to “coercive geoeconomics,” the instrumentalization of semiconductor supply chains has challenged the efficacy of traditional middle power strategies such as “balancing.” Focusing on the structural paradox of South Korea, this study seeks to answer the question of why Seoul has been forced to fully align with the United States despite the enormous economic costs. Introducing the innovative concept of “limited technological sovereignty,” this paper argues that having “production capabilities” without control over “exclusive upstream technologies” (such as American equipment and software) deprives middle powers of strategic agency. Using causal process tracing methodology, this study traces the mechanism of pressure transmission from the US 2022 export controls to Korea’s domestic political economy and shows how Seoul has shifted from a balancing strategy to a behavioral model of “coercive compliance.” A situation in which the actor accepts certain economic losses (a 78.1% drop in investment in China) to ward off technological existential risks. The research findings suggest that “limited technological sovereignty” is not an exception, but rather, as a new analytical lens, has the potential to explain the behavior of other “techno-industrial” powers such as the Netherlands and Japan in the new bipolar order.

کلیدواژه‌ها English

limited technological sovereignty
South Korea
coercive adaptation
geoeconomics
chip sector
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