The Iranian Association of International Studies International Relations Researches 2251-8444 15 3 2025 11 22 Public Opinion and the Separation of Bahrain Islands from Iran Public Opinion and the Separation of Bahrain Islands from Iran 7 34 230707 10.22034/irr.2025.517019.2694 FA Ebrahim Abbassi Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Shiraz University, Shiraz, Iran 0000-0002-1420-9556 Hossein Behroozi Ph.D. Student in Shiraz University, Shiraz,, Iran 0009-0001-2637-513X Seyyed Yousef Ghorashi Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Shiraz University, Shiraz, Iran 0000-0001-9570-4542 Ehsan Yari Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Shiraz University, Shiraz, Iran 0000-0002-3223-1212 Journal Article 2025 04 15 The relationship between public opinion and foreign policy has given rise to a significant theoretical literature in the sociology of international relations. The main question is what the position of public opinion was in Iran’s foreign policy during the Pahlavi period, and how it reacted to the separation of Bahrain. It is an essential assumption that Bahrain’s position in the separation was reactive and limited due to the conditions of the international system, the regional order, and the country’s ruling political structure. The theoretical position of public opinion in non-democratic regimes is analyzed by examining the content of speeches, documents, and memoirs of official representatives to measure public opinion. The findings reveal that the position of public opinion is reflected in the protest of a small number of parliamentarians, some statements by national parties, and the significant role of Mohammad Reza Shah in this separation, albeit with concern for the judgment of Iranian society tomorrow. Introduction In Iran has been highly sensitive about territorial integrity and foreign policy has always been involved with public opinion on issues of territorial integrity. The same trend has made the Iranian people sensitive to foreign relations and has caused historical distrust of the people and the authorities. Many changes in Iran’s configuration in the nineteenth century led to much attention to territorial integrity in the constitutional constitution and the Islamic Republic. However, people are still protesting against the violation and of Iran’s rights and the performance of the rulers in the separation of the Bahraini Islands and partition of the Caspian sea- one of the most controversial issues in the field of foreign policy and the territorial integrity of Iran was Bahrains’ Issue. The main question of this article is how public opinion reacted to the decisions of the country’s territorial integrity regarding the separation of Bahrain theorize implies that the role of public opinion on the issue of Bahrain’s separation was in the shah’s time, because of international and regional conditions and the political structure of the country prevailed with little reflection with the protest of the member of (Representatives Parliament) and the fear of the authorities in the future of Iranian society. Theoretical Framework In the light of new transformations and transitions asks whether public opinion affects foreign policy and when does public opinion affect foreign policy seeking to explain the mediating variables at the different level such as importance of foreign policy, internal structures and coalition stages and elites coordinates between public opinion and foreign policy. The multiplicity of reading and discourse pluralism about the link between public opinion and foreign policy shows that the impact of public opinion on foreign policy based on topics territorial integrity is the most important issue for public opinion. the territorial integrity seeks to maintain the unity and integrity of countries which is justified in terms of geographical stability considerations and this is the geographical stability that gives public opinion freedom in governments to determine their political situation and pursue their social and cultural, economic development, in the authoritarian regimes of some third world public opinion as a tool in the hands of governments. In this type of political systems the rulers because of new technology of notification have kept the community unaware and indifferent and in which they created a political and indifferent and in which they created a political and compatible kind of government to institution alize information. Therefore the impact of public opinion on foreign policy issues depends on the type of political regims. Among the theories the various theory of political accountability analyzes the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy policymakers more accurately, so that policy makers’ behavior against public opinion demands indifferent governments, so that politicians are always from public opinion. They do not comply and decide on political and environmental conditions. This theory claims that the impact of public opinion on foreign policy varies from one case to another and from the president to another depending on the circumstances the presidents can follow or ignore public opinion. The presidents seem to feel more pressure and reaction to public opinion but if public opinion is not focused on it or even worse political accountability is reduced. Methodology This article examines its claim by documenting the press of political parties’ statements the role of political groups, the role of formal and informal institutional etc, as the tools of extraction public opinion the aim is to determine why the role of public opinion in the foreign policy of the second Pahlavi and how to disregard it and the consequences of this disregard for the authorities will be clarified so that this issue is not repeated for Iran’s territorial integrity, over all this article can be based on a research model. Results & Discussion This article examines public opinion’s stance by examining the statements of the parties, the political speech of the representatives parliament including the Shah and the Iranian court and ambassadors in London and the London ambassadors in Tehran and the press not in the years 1968 until 1971 and the positions of personal and groups of public opinion. Some political parties and organizations explicitly or secretly declared their opposition to the Shah’s regime’s acceptance of the separation of Bahrain of course parties such as the Iran Novin party, people’s party and Mellion party and that were in favor of the government in the parliament, they voted for, but parties such as the Mellat Iran party, Jebhe Meli Iran (united national front) and the Pan Iranian Parliamentary Group criticized by the government is suing declarations with the separation of Bahrain. On the part of the left and the religious parties because of their illegality and the Shah’s dominance of documentary affairs there was no reaction, although at the time of the nationalization of the oil industry and the adoption of the nationalization of the oil by both Iranian parliaments in March 1951, Iran’s claim of Bahrain’s rule by left and religious parties was revived. In Iran at this point because of the regime’s dominance over the media, public opinion in the press is very weak. The Bahraini issue had a reflection on the support of the regime and controlled public opinion. There are reports of SAVAK’S order to write notes and conduct interviews that Bahrain is not important to Iran. The Shah calls on the press including the Ettelaat Newspaper and the Kayhan newspaper and Ayandegan newspaper to emphasis by publishing articles and notes trying to neglect Bahrain’s annexation to Iran, arguing that oil and Bahrain’s pearls are completing and capturing except for the cost of hostility to the neighbors of Iran. The structure of foreign policy in Iran during the Pahlavi era was not institutionalized so public opinion in Iran’s foreign policy was not only formed but the politicians were trying to form it in their desired direction. Foreign policy decision making was made by the Shah himself and Iranian foreign policy agencies were merely a commission of the Shah’s policies. He only founded the dignity of foreign policy decision making as only a matter of self and did not even give the foreign minister and experts and scholars of the international arena a decisive role in important decisions. Therefore despite the constitutional law constitution emphasis on the parliamentary system and the emphasis on the public opinion on important issues this was more formal. However the Shah was never comfortable with the Iranian people and he afraid from Iranian people judgment in the future. The minister of royal court of Shah Asadollah Alam in his first volume of memorandums book always talk about the Shah’s grip on Bahrain in loneliness of them. The royal court which was important organization in foreign policy at Pahlavi era also afraid from public opinion and their judgment in Iran’s future. Among the army which was an important organization in Pahlavi regime’s structure. There were also patriotic officers who were not afraid to defend their homeland, but the SAVAK domination and the Shah’s strong supervision made them not to take effective action although the Shah was obliged to respond to naval officers. Conclusions & Suggestions The point of departure of this article were the question of the role of public opinion in the separation of Bahrain research literature on why Bahrain’s Separation has been discussed but did not examine the position of public opinion and how it is acted. This article examines public opinion theories and the index of public opinion institutions such as parties, groups and associations, personalities and … and official institutions such as the Shah and royal court and the government assembly, foreign ministry and the army and … and their reaction to public opinion. They tried to public opinion from a sociological perspective and its impact on Iranian foreign relations answer from the documents and memories in the light of theories presented we concluded that because the structure of the Pahlavi regime was undemocratic it was in the light of the role of the Shah and the court and more in wishing the government to be role playing in the Persian Gulf and collaborating with the international system and disregard for public opinion settle, Although this never abandoned the fear of judging the Shah and other officials. It seems that lack of public opinion on this issue and the lack of attention of the intellectuals and in particular the scholars on the separation of Bahrain reduced the regime’s political accountability suggestion for this article is to emphasize to public opinion as a important arms of foreign policy at remarkable foreign policy file’s as a territorial integrity. If Mohammad Reza Shah valued public opinion, he could make a better decision on Bahrain. This was subject to the freedom of the press, parties, groups and elections to appoint representative parliament to comment on Bahrain’s separation for assign members of parliament for assessment was at separation of Bahrain’s case. . The relationship between public opinion and foreign policy has given rise to a significant theoretical literature in the sociology of international relations. The main question is what the position of public opinion was in Iran’s foreign policy during the Pahlavi period, and how it reacted to the separation of Bahrain. It is an essential assumption that Bahrain’s position in the separation was reactive and limited due to the conditions of the international system, the regional order, and the country’s ruling political structure. The theoretical position of public opinion in non-democratic regimes is analyzed by examining the content of speeches, documents, and memoirs of official representatives to measure public opinion. The findings reveal that the position of public opinion is reflected in the protest of a small number of parliamentarians, some statements by national parties, and the significant role of Mohammad Reza Shah in this separation, albeit with concern for the judgment of Iranian society tomorrow. Introduction In Iran has been highly sensitive about territorial integrity and foreign policy has always been involved with public opinion on issues of territorial integrity. The same trend has made the Iranian people sensitive to foreign relations and has caused historical distrust of the people and the authorities. Many changes in Iran’s configuration in the nineteenth century led to much attention to territorial integrity in the constitutional constitution and the Islamic Republic. However, people are still protesting against the violation and of Iran’s rights and the performance of the rulers in the separation of the Bahraini Islands and partition of the Caspian sea- one of the most controversial issues in the field of foreign policy and the territorial integrity of Iran was Bahrains’ Issue. The main question of this article is how public opinion reacted to the decisions of the country’s territorial integrity regarding the separation of Bahrain theorize implies that the role of public opinion on the issue of Bahrain’s separation was in the shah’s time, because of international and regional conditions and the political structure of the country prevailed with little reflection with the protest of the member of (Representatives Parliament) and the fear of the authorities in the future of Iranian society. Theoretical Framework In the light of new transformations and transitions asks whether public opinion affects foreign policy and when does public opinion affect foreign policy seeking to explain the mediating variables at the different level such as importance of foreign policy, internal structures and coalition stages and elites coordinates between public opinion and foreign policy. The multiplicity of reading and discourse pluralism about the link between public opinion and foreign policy shows that the impact of public opinion on foreign policy based on topics territorial integrity is the most important issue for public opinion. the territorial integrity seeks to maintain the unity and integrity of countries which is justified in terms of geographical stability considerations and this is the geographical stability that gives public opinion freedom in governments to determine their political situation and pursue their social and cultural, economic development, in the authoritarian regimes of some third world public opinion as a tool in the hands of governments. In this type of political systems the rulers because of new technology of notification have kept the community unaware and indifferent and in which they created a political and indifferent and in which they created a political and compatible kind of government to institution alize information. Therefore the impact of public opinion on foreign policy issues depends on the type of political regims. Among the theories the various theory of political accountability analyzes the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy policymakers more accurately, so that policy makers’ behavior against public opinion demands indifferent governments, so that politicians are always from public opinion. They do not comply and decide on political and environmental conditions. This theory claims that the impact of public opinion on foreign policy varies from one case to another and from the president to another depending on the circumstances the presidents can follow or ignore public opinion. The presidents seem to feel more pressure and reaction to public opinion but if public opinion is not focused on it or even worse political accountability is reduced. Methodology This article examines its claim by documenting the press of political parties’ statements the role of political groups, the role of formal and informal institutional etc, as the tools of extraction public opinion the aim is to determine why the role of public opinion in the foreign policy of the second Pahlavi and how to disregard it and the consequences of this disregard for the authorities will be clarified so that this issue is not repeated for Iran’s territorial integrity, over all this article can be based on a research model. Results & Discussion This article examines public opinion’s stance by examining the statements of the parties, the political speech of the representatives parliament including the Shah and the Iranian court and ambassadors in London and the London ambassadors in Tehran and the press not in the years 1968 until 1971 and the positions of personal and groups of public opinion. Some political parties and organizations explicitly or secretly declared their opposition to the Shah’s regime’s acceptance of the separation of Bahrain of course parties such as the Iran Novin party, people’s party and Mellion party and that were in favor of the government in the parliament, they voted for, but parties such as the Mellat Iran party, Jebhe Meli Iran (united national front) and the Pan Iranian Parliamentary Group criticized by the government is suing declarations with the separation of Bahrain. On the part of the left and the religious parties because of their illegality and the Shah’s dominance of documentary affairs there was no reaction, although at the time of the nationalization of the oil industry and the adoption of the nationalization of the oil by both Iranian parliaments in March 1951, Iran’s claim of Bahrain’s rule by left and religious parties was revived. In Iran at this point because of the regime’s dominance over the media, public opinion in the press is very weak. The Bahraini issue had a reflection on the support of the regime and controlled public opinion. There are reports of SAVAK’S order to write notes and conduct interviews that Bahrain is not important to Iran. The Shah calls on the press including the Ettelaat Newspaper and the Kayhan newspaper and Ayandegan newspaper to emphasis by publishing articles and notes trying to neglect Bahrain’s annexation to Iran, arguing that oil and Bahrain’s pearls are completing and capturing except for the cost of hostility to the neighbors of Iran. The structure of foreign policy in Iran during the Pahlavi era was not institutionalized so public opinion in Iran’s foreign policy was not only formed but the politicians were trying to form it in their desired direction. Foreign policy decision making was made by the Shah himself and Iranian foreign policy agencies were merely a commission of the Shah’s policies. He only founded the dignity of foreign policy decision making as only a matter of self and did not even give the foreign minister and experts and scholars of the international arena a decisive role in important decisions. Therefore despite the constitutional law constitution emphasis on the parliamentary system and the emphasis on the public opinion on important issues this was more formal. However the Shah was never comfortable with the Iranian people and he afraid from Iranian people judgment in the future. The minister of royal court of Shah Asadollah Alam in his first volume of memorandums book always talk about the Shah’s grip on Bahrain in loneliness of them. The royal court which was important organization in foreign policy at Pahlavi era also afraid from public opinion and their judgment in Iran’s future. Among the army which was an important organization in Pahlavi regime’s structure. There were also patriotic officers who were not afraid to defend their homeland, but the SAVAK domination and the Shah’s strong supervision made them not to take effective action although the Shah was obliged to respond to naval officers. Conclusions & Suggestions The point of departure of this article were the question of the role of public opinion in the separation of Bahrain research literature on why Bahrain’s Separation has been discussed but did not examine the position of public opinion and how it is acted. This article examines public opinion theories and the index of public opinion institutions such as parties, groups and associations, personalities and … and official institutions such as the Shah and royal court and the government assembly, foreign ministry and the army and … and their reaction to public opinion. They tried to public opinion from a sociological perspective and its impact on Iranian foreign relations answer from the documents and memories in the light of theories presented we concluded that because the structure of the Pahlavi regime was undemocratic it was in the light of the role of the Shah and the court and more in wishing the government to be role playing in the Persian Gulf and collaborating with the international system and disregard for public opinion settle, Although this never abandoned the fear of judging the Shah and other officials. It seems that lack of public opinion on this issue and the lack of attention of the intellectuals and in particular the scholars on the separation of Bahrain reduced the regime’s political accountability suggestion for this article is to emphasize to public opinion as a important arms of foreign policy at remarkable foreign policy file’s as a territorial integrity. If Mohammad Reza Shah valued public opinion, he could make a better decision on Bahrain. This was subject to the freedom of the press, parties, groups and elections to appoint representative parliament to comment on Bahrain’s separation for assign members of parliament for assessment was at separation of Bahrain’s case. .

https://www.iisajournals.ir/article_230707_eb3aeb6a9a361350efc9062bb893188f.pdf

The Iranian Association of International Studies International Relations Researches 2251-8444 15 3 2025 11 22 Foreign requirements and the securitization of the Justice and Development Party's foreign policy in Türkiye Foreign requirements and the securitization of the Justice and Development Party's foreign policy in Türkiye 35 56 233990 10.22034/irr.2025.547130.2768 FA Seyyed Shamsuddin Sadeghi Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Razi University, Kermanshah, Iran. 0000-0003-2113-1707 Masoud Akhwan Kazemi Professor, Department of Political Science, Razi University, Kermanshah, Iran. 0000-0003-4129-9689 Hamidreza Cheraghi PhD student, Department of Political Science, Razi University, Kermanshah, Iran. 0009-0003-8973-3437 Journal Article 2025 09 14 The rise of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey in 2002, within the framework of Ahmet Davutoglu's "Strategic Doctrine", created a new approach to the country's foreign policy, which aimed to resolve international conflicts, tensions with neighbors, use soft power, and improve relations with the West. Turkey acted as an active player in the Middle East region, seeking to present a model of democratic governance. However, after the developments of 2011, the revolutions known as the Arab Spring, we witnessed a turn and ups and downs in the country's foreign policy. In this study, using a descriptive and analytical method within the framework of the Copenhagen Security School, we seek to examine the issue of what role external factors have played in the securitization of Turkey's foreign policy. Our hypothesis is that factors such as human rights pressures, lack of membership in the European Union, insecurity in the Middle East, the failed coup of 2016, European and American sanctions, and the issue of tension with Cyprus have led to the securitization of this country's foreign policy. It must be said that due to such issues, distrust has arisen in Turkey's relations with the West and its neighbors, and fear of intervention and the political and security threats that Turkey will face in the present and future regarding these issues has led Erdogan's strategic policy to shift towards securitization rather than diplomatic engagement in order to secure the country's national interests and security in a secure environment. Introduction The foreign policy of countries has always been influenced by domestic policies and conditions. In other words, the economic, political, and social conditions, as well as the internal and external developments of any country, have a direct impact on the direction of its foreign policy, and this is one of the general rules in the science of international relations and foreign policy. Turkey is no exception to this rule, and external developments and external pressures have had an impact on its policy and strategy. Turkey has brought opportunities and challenges to this actor due to its strategic location at the junction of Europe and the Middle East. Before the AKP came to power, Turkey tended to orient itself towards the West, but with the AKP coming to power, it witnessed the country's interaction with the surrounding environment of the Middle East and the East, and under the title of Davutoglu's strategic doctrine, it has undertaken strategic interaction in its foreign policy. After that, the policy of neo-Ottomanism and the revival of Turkey appeared in the strategy of the Erdogan government since 2007, which sought to revive Turkey by emphasizing the country's past, namely the Ottoman Empire. However, since 2011, after the beginning of the Arab revolutions in the region, The Middle East and North Africa: In this country, the Justice and Development Party's strategy has moved towards securitization. In this research, we seek to examine how external factors have affected the securitization of Turkish foreign policy between 2011 and 2024. In this study, we will examine it. First, we will examine the foreign policy of the Justice and Development Party, and then we will examine security examples and the shift from the policy of interaction and communication towards security, and how its reflection has shown itself in Turkish foreign policy. Then, we will address the obstacles and external factors related to the insecure environment and geopolitical constraints, USsanctions, non-membership in the European Union, human rights tensions, and territorial problems with neighbors that have led Turkey towards distrust, a security-oriented and security-building perspective, causing this country to move towards security in its foreign policy strategy. This has been analyzed and examined using a descriptive and analytical method and references to library resources and current research. Theoretical Framework Barry Buzan defines security as between minds and considers the starting point of security to be based on the decision of actors that the issue of security is recognized in society. Two approaches should be considered: first, the security threshold of nation states is different from each other; second, how others think about and evaluate the security of an issue Barry Buzan, the founder of the Copenhagen School and the author of the book People, States and Fear, redefined the concept of security by listing three main dimensions for it. A broad definition of security: Buzan considers five political, military, economic, social and environmental parts of security, which are not only not separate but are also highly intertwined Securitization Securitization is the process of labeling a security issue and its consequences through labeling problems into major threats that require urgent action, which may include breaking previously binding rules. In other words, securitizing an issue at the international level means making it an existential and important issue that should not be discussed like ordinary political issues. Rather, high-level leaders should firmly define its task before other issues In other words, securitization can be understood as the process of placing a specific issue in the security realm by resorting to the speech act, usually by political leaders, by making it appear threatening. This, in turn, will lead to emergency measures and suspension of normal policy in order to deal with that issue, if the relevant audience agrees. The concept of securitization means that every school inherently carries some kind of threat. The concept of securitization was first introduced into international relations by Weaver in 1990, and this concept was perfected after the publication of the book A New Framework for Security Analysis Weaver initially defined security as a “speech act” and showed that the meaning of security is linked to the “discourse of security”. In his article “Securitization and De-Securitization”, inspired by linguistic theory, Weaver called security a verbal movement; that is, the movement and type of language and expression of content by the speaker defines security (Rostami and Naderi, 2016:193). The Copenhagen School believes that security is intersubjective. Here, they emphasize more on the shared understanding that is created through the process of dialogue and communication between security agents and audiences about whether an issue is a threat or not. Methodology This research has been used in the study of Turkish foreign policy using a descriptive and analytical method, citing library resources and analyses of scientific institutions, and reviewing existing documents and evidence in the field of foreign policy and national security. Discussion This study examines Turkey's foreign policy since 2011, when the Justice and Development Party's strategy moved towards security. Before 2011, the Turkish government had defined its strategy as seeking peaceful relations with its neighbors and regional governments and resolving tensions. However, after the developments of 2011, known as the Arab Spring, we have witnessed a change in the Turkish government's foreign policy approach towards security. Factors such as the insecurity of Turkey's regional environment, human rights violations, Turkey's non-membership in the European Union, tension with Cyprus, the imposition of sanctions by the United States, and the coup attempt in 2016 have caused Turkey to face external pressures, which has caused Turkey's foreign policy strategy to move towards security. The Erdogan government's actions have been completely security-oriented, and Turkey's internal space has become secure, which can contain these external threats by securing society and presenting external factors as a threat to Turkey's territorial integrity. Conclusion Regarding the securitization of Turkey's foreign policy, it should be said that international requirements have caused Turkey to move towards structural security and a narrow definition of security in its foreign policy discourse by providing a context of insecurity, distrust, and an atmosphere of competition and tension. In the face of these problems that threaten the territorial integrity and interests of this country from the outside and the surrounding areas, Turkey must be able to define security for its foreign policy and implement its requirements in the context of its society and strategic policies. Regarding the insecurity in Turkey's surrounding environment with the security challenge, the issue of human rights, the interference of the United States and Europe in Turkish affairs, and the formation of independence movements such as the Kurdish minority, the issue of sanctions, the reduction of military and economic power, tensions with neighbors, and the threat to the privacy of this country, along with its lack of membership in the European Union, Turkey must be able to rely on its power in the region and, by securitizing these threats, move society towards cohesion and stability in the field of adopting a coherent security approach. The rise of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey in 2002, within the framework of Ahmet Davutoglu's "Strategic Doctrine", created a new approach to the country's foreign policy, which aimed to resolve international conflicts, tensions with neighbors, use soft power, and improve relations with the West. Turkey acted as an active player in the Middle East region, seeking to present a model of democratic governance. However, after the developments of 2011, the revolutions known as the Arab Spring, we witnessed a turn and ups and downs in the country's foreign policy. In this study, using a descriptive and analytical method within the framework of the Copenhagen Security School, we seek to examine the issue of what role external factors have played in the securitization of Turkey's foreign policy. Our hypothesis is that factors such as human rights pressures, lack of membership in the European Union, insecurity in the Middle East, the failed coup of 2016, European and American sanctions, and the issue of tension with Cyprus have led to the securitization of this country's foreign policy. It must be said that due to such issues, distrust has arisen in Turkey's relations with the West and its neighbors, and fear of intervention and the political and security threats that Turkey will face in the present and future regarding these issues has led Erdogan's strategic policy to shift towards securitization rather than diplomatic engagement in order to secure the country's national interests and security in a secure environment. Introduction The foreign policy of countries has always been influenced by domestic policies and conditions. In other words, the economic, political, and social conditions, as well as the internal and external developments of any country, have a direct impact on the direction of its foreign policy, and this is one of the general rules in the science of international relations and foreign policy. Turkey is no exception to this rule, and external developments and external pressures have had an impact on its policy and strategy. Turkey has brought opportunities and challenges to this actor due to its strategic location at the junction of Europe and the Middle East. Before the AKP came to power, Turkey tended to orient itself towards the West, but with the AKP coming to power, it witnessed the country's interaction with the surrounding environment of the Middle East and the East, and under the title of Davutoglu's strategic doctrine, it has undertaken strategic interaction in its foreign policy. After that, the policy of neo-Ottomanism and the revival of Turkey appeared in the strategy of the Erdogan government since 2007, which sought to revive Turkey by emphasizing the country's past, namely the Ottoman Empire. However, since 2011, after the beginning of the Arab revolutions in the region, The Middle East and North Africa: In this country, the Justice and Development Party's strategy has moved towards securitization. In this research, we seek to examine how external factors have affected the securitization of Turkish foreign policy between 2011 and 2024. In this study, we will examine it. First, we will examine the foreign policy of the Justice and Development Party, and then we will examine security examples and the shift from the policy of interaction and communication towards security, and how its reflection has shown itself in Turkish foreign policy. Then, we will address the obstacles and external factors related to the insecure environment and geopolitical constraints, USsanctions, non-membership in the European Union, human rights tensions, and territorial problems with neighbors that have led Turkey towards distrust, a security-oriented and security-building perspective, causing this country to move towards security in its foreign policy strategy. This has been analyzed and examined using a descriptive and analytical method and references to library resources and current research. Theoretical Framework Barry Buzan defines security as between minds and considers the starting point of security to be based on the decision of actors that the issue of security is recognized in society. Two approaches should be considered: first, the security threshold of nation states is different from each other; second, how others think about and evaluate the security of an issue Barry Buzan, the founder of the Copenhagen School and the author of the book People, States and Fear, redefined the concept of security by listing three main dimensions for it. A broad definition of security: Buzan considers five political, military, economic, social and environmental parts of security, which are not only not separate but are also highly intertwined Securitization Securitization is the process of labeling a security issue and its consequences through labeling problems into major threats that require urgent action, which may include breaking previously binding rules. In other words, securitizing an issue at the international level means making it an existential and important issue that should not be discussed like ordinary political issues. Rather, high-level leaders should firmly define its task before other issues In other words, securitization can be understood as the process of placing a specific issue in the security realm by resorting to the speech act, usually by political leaders, by making it appear threatening. This, in turn, will lead to emergency measures and suspension of normal policy in order to deal with that issue, if the relevant audience agrees. The concept of securitization means that every school inherently carries some kind of threat. The concept of securitization was first introduced into international relations by Weaver in 1990, and this concept was perfected after the publication of the book A New Framework for Security Analysis Weaver initially defined security as a “speech act” and showed that the meaning of security is linked to the “discourse of security”. In his article “Securitization and De-Securitization”, inspired by linguistic theory, Weaver called security a verbal movement; that is, the movement and type of language and expression of content by the speaker defines security (Rostami and Naderi, 2016:193). The Copenhagen School believes that security is intersubjective. Here, they emphasize more on the shared understanding that is created through the process of dialogue and communication between security agents and audiences about whether an issue is a threat or not. Methodology This research has been used in the study of Turkish foreign policy using a descriptive and analytical method, citing library resources and analyses of scientific institutions, and reviewing existing documents and evidence in the field of foreign policy and national security. Discussion This study examines Turkey's foreign policy since 2011, when the Justice and Development Party's strategy moved towards security. Before 2011, the Turkish government had defined its strategy as seeking peaceful relations with its neighbors and regional governments and resolving tensions. However, after the developments of 2011, known as the Arab Spring, we have witnessed a change in the Turkish government's foreign policy approach towards security. Factors such as the insecurity of Turkey's regional environment, human rights violations, Turkey's non-membership in the European Union, tension with Cyprus, the imposition of sanctions by the United States, and the coup attempt in 2016 have caused Turkey to face external pressures, which has caused Turkey's foreign policy strategy to move towards security. The Erdogan government's actions have been completely security-oriented, and Turkey's internal space has become secure, which can contain these external threats by securing society and presenting external factors as a threat to Turkey's territorial integrity. Conclusion Regarding the securitization of Turkey's foreign policy, it should be said that international requirements have caused Turkey to move towards structural security and a narrow definition of security in its foreign policy discourse by providing a context of insecurity, distrust, and an atmosphere of competition and tension. In the face of these problems that threaten the territorial integrity and interests of this country from the outside and the surrounding areas, Turkey must be able to define security for its foreign policy and implement its requirements in the context of its society and strategic policies. Regarding the insecurity in Turkey's surrounding environment with the security challenge, the issue of human rights, the interference of the United States and Europe in Turkish affairs, and the formation of independence movements such as the Kurdish minority, the issue of sanctions, the reduction of military and economic power, tensions with neighbors, and the threat to the privacy of this country, along with its lack of membership in the European Union, Turkey must be able to rely on its power in the region and, by securitizing these threats, move society towards cohesion and stability in the field of adopting a coherent security approach.

https://www.iisajournals.ir/article_233990_7dbbf01928f93a57a7073403a6612555.pdf

The Iranian Association of International Studies International Relations Researches 2251-8444 15 3 2025 11 22 Designing a model for The economisation of Islamic Republic of Iran's foreign policy Designing a model for The economisation of Islamic Republic of Iran's foreign policy 59 75 234101 10.22034/irr.2025.538652.2741 FA Ahad Rezayan Ghaye Bashi University of Tehran, Faculty of Governance, Department of Futures Studies 0000-0001-5119-3613 Ali Asghar Pourezzat Tehran University 0000-0002-1875-3479 Seyed Mehdi Sadidi tehran university 0009-0006-9652-095X Journal Article 2025 08 02 This research examines the economization of Iran's foreign policy as a key strategy for achieving sustainable development and strengthening national security.The study employs a qualitative approach within a two-stage framework. In the first stage, an initial conceptual model was developed through semi-structured interviews with 18 executive elites, utilizing grounded theory. Subsequently, to mitigate institutional bias and validate the findings, this model was reviewed and refined in a second stage by an expert panel composed of independent academics and private sector actors. Synthesized findings indicate that overt obstacles, such as inefficient bureaucracy and international sanctions, are symptoms of a deeper root cause: the 'structural conflict between economic logic and political-security logic'. This conflict, stemming from the lack of a unified political will, is the main barrier to realizing economic diplomacy. The final model posits that the success of executive strategies (e.g., institutional reforms and developing regional relations) is entirely conditional upon fulfilling a key prerequisite: the establishment of a supra-institutional political will to prioritize the economy. Ultimately, the economization of Iran's foreign policy is not a choice but a strategic imperative that requires a paradigm shift from crisis management to development strategy. The study recommends that policymakers focus shift from mere executive reforms toward establishing macro-level mechanisms to resolve institutional conflicts of interest and forge a national strategic consensus. Introduction In the contemporary global landscape, the structure of international politics is undergoing a fundamental transformation, shifting from a purely security-oriented and political state to one that is increasingly economic and political in nature. Nations and international actors are now constantly seeking new arenas for self-advancement, particularly through economic means. Economics has evolved into an essential prerequisite for development, and a nation's power is no longer defined solely by its military capabilities but is increasingly measured by indicators such as Gross Domestic Product and the depth of its economic integration. In this new geo-economic order, the conquest of markets, rather than territories, has become the strategic priority for nations worldwide. This paradigm shift underscores that neglecting development and its core components can pose serious threats to national security in the long run. Within this context, foreign policy serves as the critical mechanism for navigating the complex interplay between domestic development needs and the powerful trends of the global economy. The relationship between a country's economy and its foreign policy demonstrates that the primary objective of any foreign policy is to secure national interests, which inherently include economic development, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. Despite numerous studies on Iran's economic relations and the impact of sanctions, a coherent and indigenous theoretical framework for the economization of the Islamic Republic of Iran's foreign policy has been notably absent. Much of the existing research has been limited to specific case studies or descriptive analyses of structural barriers, failing to systematically link diplomacy, economics, and national policymaking. This research, therefore, aims to fill this critical conceptual and policy gap by designing and validating a native model for the economization of Iran's foreign policy. The ultimate goal is to propose a model that can serve as a roadmap for achieving sustainable development, enhancing economic resilience, and strengthening national security. Theoretical Framework The conceptual foundation of this study is the economization of foreign policy, a process that involves a deliberate shift in a nation's diplomatic and foreign policy objectives from purely political and security-driven goals toward those centered on economic and developmental outcomes. This concept shares significant overlap with established terms such as economic diplomacy and geo-economics. The theoretical underpinnings of this research are drawn from schools of thought that emphasize the potential for economic cooperation to serve as a tool for managing international conflicts and reducing security-related costs, thereby fostering a more stable environment for national growth. These theories posit that active foreign policy and economic growth share a mutually reinforcing relationship. However, the primary theoretical challenge, especially in the context of developing nations like Iran, emerges from the inherent tension between different governing logics. A critical political economy perspective reveals a fundamental conflict between the profit-driven, cooperative logic of the global economy and the value-based, security-oriented logic that often dominates a state's internal political and ideological structures. This duality creates significant friction, as foreign policy becomes caught at the intersection of global structural pressures and domestic socio-economic configurations. When a nation's foreign policy is heavily influenced by non-economic considerations, the implementation of an economic-first approach faces profound challenges. This study addresses this theoretical problem by examining the phenomenon at three distinct levels of analysis: the macro (national development strategies and foreign policy goals), meso (inter-agency interactions and conflicts), and micro (the operational conduct of diplomats and commercial attachés). Methodology This research employed a qualitative approach, utilizing a grounded theory strategy to generate a conceptual model rooted directly in empirical data rather than testing a pre-existing hypothesis. The study was designed and executed in a two-stage framework to enhance the validity of the findings and to actively mitigate potential institutional bias. In the first stage, the initial conceptual model was developed through in-depth, semi-structured interviews. A total of 18 executive elites and senior policymakers, who possessed direct, hands-on experience with the subject matter, were selected through purposive and snowball sampling techniques. These interviews provided a rich and detailed dataset reflecting the perspectives of those operating within the system. The data gathered were meticulously analyzed using a three-stage coding process, including open, axial, and selective coding, to identify core concepts, categories, and their relationships. In the second stage, the initial model was subjected to a rigorous process of critique and refinement through an expert panel validation. This panel was composed of 6 distinguished and independent experts, including high-profile academics in international economics and prominent actors from the private sector who were not affiliated with any official government positions. This stage was specifically designed to control for the inherent pro-establishment viewpoint that might have influenced the findings from the first stage. This dual-phase methodology allowed for the creation of a balanced and robust model that integrates both internal and external perspectives, thereby producing a more nuanced and comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon. Discussion The synthesized findings from the two-stage research process revealed a multi-layered understanding of the obstacles to the economization of Iran's foreign policy. In the first stage, interviews with executive elites identified a set of tangible, operational challenges that they face daily. These included an inefficient and cumbersome bureaucracy, a persistent lack of coordination between government ministries and institutions, and the complex, ever-present difficulties arising from international sanctions. These findings accurately depicted the challenges at the meso-level of governance. However, the expert panel in the second stage argued that these observable issues were merely symptoms of a deeper, more foundational root cause. The core finding of this study is that the primary impediment is a structural conflict between the economic logic and the political-security logic that pervades the national decision-making apparatus. This conflict, which is the central barrier to realizing effective economic diplomacy, stems from the absence of a unified, supra-institutional political will to consistently prioritize the economy. The panel concluded that without such a unified will, executive strategies, institutional reforms, and efforts to develop regional relations are destined to fail or yield suboptimal results. Furthermore, the findings distinguished between short-term survival strategies (such as pivoting to the East or developing alternative financial mechanisms to bypass sanctions) and long-term development imperatives. The expert panel cautioned that while survival strategies are necessary, they often increase transaction costs and should not be mistaken for a sustainable development path. Thus, the final model posits that the success of any executive-level reforms is entirely conditional upon fulfilling a key prerequisite: the establishment of an overarching political will to prioritize the economy. Conclusion This research concludes that the economization of the Islamic Republic of Iran's foreign policy is not merely a technical or managerial challenge but a profound political and structural issue. It is not simply a policy choice but a strategic imperative for effective governance in the modern world. The realization of this imperative necessitates a complete paradigm shift—from a mindset of crisis management to a forward-looking development strategy. The primary innovation of this study lies not in offering a new list of reforms, but in identifying, structuring, and highlighting the critical preconditions required for any such reforms to succeed. Based on the final model and synthesized findings, the study puts forth a key strategic recommendation for senior policymakers: the establishment of a Supreme Council for Economic Development and Foreign Relations. This proposed body should be a supra-institutional entity, comprising heads of government branches, key stakeholders, and private sector representatives. Its primary mandate would not be day-to-day implementation but rather to forge strategic coherence, resolve inter-agency conflicts of interest, and ensure that economic development is given priority in the nation's major foreign policy decisions. The success of any operational measures, such as strengthening the economic deputyship of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, depends entirely on the creation of such a high-level consensus-building mechanism. Without addressing this foundational requirement, even the best-designed executive reforms will ultimately be neutralized by deeper structural obstacles. This research examines the economization of Iran's foreign policy as a key strategy for achieving sustainable development and strengthening national security.The study employs a qualitative approach within a two-stage framework. In the first stage, an initial conceptual model was developed through semi-structured interviews with 18 executive elites, utilizing grounded theory. Subsequently, to mitigate institutional bias and validate the findings, this model was reviewed and refined in a second stage by an expert panel composed of independent academics and private sector actors. Synthesized findings indicate that overt obstacles, such as inefficient bureaucracy and international sanctions, are symptoms of a deeper root cause: the 'structural conflict between economic logic and political-security logic'. This conflict, stemming from the lack of a unified political will, is the main barrier to realizing economic diplomacy. The final model posits that the success of executive strategies (e.g., institutional reforms and developing regional relations) is entirely conditional upon fulfilling a key prerequisite: the establishment of a supra-institutional political will to prioritize the economy. Ultimately, the economization of Iran's foreign policy is not a choice but a strategic imperative that requires a paradigm shift from crisis management to development strategy. The study recommends that policymakers focus shift from mere executive reforms toward establishing macro-level mechanisms to resolve institutional conflicts of interest and forge a national strategic consensus. Introduction In the contemporary global landscape, the structure of international politics is undergoing a fundamental transformation, shifting from a purely security-oriented and political state to one that is increasingly economic and political in nature. Nations and international actors are now constantly seeking new arenas for self-advancement, particularly through economic means. Economics has evolved into an essential prerequisite for development, and a nation's power is no longer defined solely by its military capabilities but is increasingly measured by indicators such as Gross Domestic Product and the depth of its economic integration. In this new geo-economic order, the conquest of markets, rather than territories, has become the strategic priority for nations worldwide. This paradigm shift underscores that neglecting development and its core components can pose serious threats to national security in the long run. Within this context, foreign policy serves as the critical mechanism for navigating the complex interplay between domestic development needs and the powerful trends of the global economy. The relationship between a country's economy and its foreign policy demonstrates that the primary objective of any foreign policy is to secure national interests, which inherently include economic development, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. Despite numerous studies on Iran's economic relations and the impact of sanctions, a coherent and indigenous theoretical framework for the economization of the Islamic Republic of Iran's foreign policy has been notably absent. Much of the existing research has been limited to specific case studies or descriptive analyses of structural barriers, failing to systematically link diplomacy, economics, and national policymaking. This research, therefore, aims to fill this critical conceptual and policy gap by designing and validating a native model for the economization of Iran's foreign policy. The ultimate goal is to propose a model that can serve as a roadmap for achieving sustainable development, enhancing economic resilience, and strengthening national security. Theoretical Framework The conceptual foundation of this study is the economization of foreign policy, a process that involves a deliberate shift in a nation's diplomatic and foreign policy objectives from purely political and security-driven goals toward those centered on economic and developmental outcomes. This concept shares significant overlap with established terms such as economic diplomacy and geo-economics. The theoretical underpinnings of this research are drawn from schools of thought that emphasize the potential for economic cooperation to serve as a tool for managing international conflicts and reducing security-related costs, thereby fostering a more stable environment for national growth. These theories posit that active foreign policy and economic growth share a mutually reinforcing relationship. However, the primary theoretical challenge, especially in the context of developing nations like Iran, emerges from the inherent tension between different governing logics. A critical political economy perspective reveals a fundamental conflict between the profit-driven, cooperative logic of the global economy and the value-based, security-oriented logic that often dominates a state's internal political and ideological structures. This duality creates significant friction, as foreign policy becomes caught at the intersection of global structural pressures and domestic socio-economic configurations. When a nation's foreign policy is heavily influenced by non-economic considerations, the implementation of an economic-first approach faces profound challenges. This study addresses this theoretical problem by examining the phenomenon at three distinct levels of analysis: the macro (national development strategies and foreign policy goals), meso (inter-agency interactions and conflicts), and micro (the operational conduct of diplomats and commercial attachés). Methodology This research employed a qualitative approach, utilizing a grounded theory strategy to generate a conceptual model rooted directly in empirical data rather than testing a pre-existing hypothesis. The study was designed and executed in a two-stage framework to enhance the validity of the findings and to actively mitigate potential institutional bias. In the first stage, the initial conceptual model was developed through in-depth, semi-structured interviews. A total of 18 executive elites and senior policymakers, who possessed direct, hands-on experience with the subject matter, were selected through purposive and snowball sampling techniques. These interviews provided a rich and detailed dataset reflecting the perspectives of those operating within the system. The data gathered were meticulously analyzed using a three-stage coding process, including open, axial, and selective coding, to identify core concepts, categories, and their relationships. In the second stage, the initial model was subjected to a rigorous process of critique and refinement through an expert panel validation. This panel was composed of 6 distinguished and independent experts, including high-profile academics in international economics and prominent actors from the private sector who were not affiliated with any official government positions. This stage was specifically designed to control for the inherent pro-establishment viewpoint that might have influenced the findings from the first stage. This dual-phase methodology allowed for the creation of a balanced and robust model that integrates both internal and external perspectives, thereby producing a more nuanced and comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon. Discussion The synthesized findings from the two-stage research process revealed a multi-layered understanding of the obstacles to the economization of Iran's foreign policy. In the first stage, interviews with executive elites identified a set of tangible, operational challenges that they face daily. These included an inefficient and cumbersome bureaucracy, a persistent lack of coordination between government ministries and institutions, and the complex, ever-present difficulties arising from international sanctions. These findings accurately depicted the challenges at the meso-level of governance. However, the expert panel in the second stage argued that these observable issues were merely symptoms of a deeper, more foundational root cause. The core finding of this study is that the primary impediment is a structural conflict between the economic logic and the political-security logic that pervades the national decision-making apparatus. This conflict, which is the central barrier to realizing effective economic diplomacy, stems from the absence of a unified, supra-institutional political will to consistently prioritize the economy. The panel concluded that without such a unified will, executive strategies, institutional reforms, and efforts to develop regional relations are destined to fail or yield suboptimal results. Furthermore, the findings distinguished between short-term survival strategies (such as pivoting to the East or developing alternative financial mechanisms to bypass sanctions) and long-term development imperatives. The expert panel cautioned that while survival strategies are necessary, they often increase transaction costs and should not be mistaken for a sustainable development path. Thus, the final model posits that the success of any executive-level reforms is entirely conditional upon fulfilling a key prerequisite: the establishment of an overarching political will to prioritize the economy. Conclusion This research concludes that the economization of the Islamic Republic of Iran's foreign policy is not merely a technical or managerial challenge but a profound political and structural issue. It is not simply a policy choice but a strategic imperative for effective governance in the modern world. The realization of this imperative necessitates a complete paradigm shift—from a mindset of crisis management to a forward-looking development strategy. The primary innovation of this study lies not in offering a new list of reforms, but in identifying, structuring, and highlighting the critical preconditions required for any such reforms to succeed. Based on the final model and synthesized findings, the study puts forth a key strategic recommendation for senior policymakers: the establishment of a Supreme Council for Economic Development and Foreign Relations. This proposed body should be a supra-institutional entity, comprising heads of government branches, key stakeholders, and private sector representatives. Its primary mandate would not be day-to-day implementation but rather to forge strategic coherence, resolve inter-agency conflicts of interest, and ensure that economic development is given priority in the nation's major foreign policy decisions. The success of any operational measures, such as strengthening the economic deputyship of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, depends entirely on the creation of such a high-level consensus-building mechanism. Without addressing this foundational requirement, even the best-designed executive reforms will ultimately be neutralized by deeper structural obstacles.

https://www.iisajournals.ir/article_234101_b0ea99e0fbc1e914b8ed344e3d66c541.pdf

The Iranian Association of International Studies International Relations Researches 2251-8444 15 3 2025 11 22 The Impact of Strategic Culture on India's Foreign Policy Towards Israel During Narendra Modi The Impact of Strategic Culture on India's Foreign Policy Towards Israel During Narendra Modi 77 103 234555 10.22034/irr.2025.547596.2769 FA Roohollah Talebi Arani گروه سیاست جهانی و منطقه ای دانشگاه شهید بهشتی 0009-0000-7200-1000 Masoud Hamiani Shahid Beheshti University IR Phd Student 0009-0000-2886-2006 Journal Article 2025 09 16 The foreign policy is constantly changing and evolving under the influence of structural factors, internal dynamics, intentions and motivations of leaders. Meanwhile, India's foreign policy as an emerging power has undergone significant changes since the right-wing government of Narendra Modi came to power. These changes are reflected in India's new policy towards West Asia, titled "Thinking West" and increasing political, military and economic interactions with like-minded actors in the region such as Israel. The aim of this research is to identify the roots of change in India's foreign policy towards the West Asia region, and especially Israel, during the Narendra Modi era. This article is a descriptive analysis-based research and uses a qualitative method to analyze the collected data. The research data was collected using documentary methods and relying on library sources, articles and statements of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Indian leaders. The research findings show that India's strategic culture, influenced by macro inputs such as the strategic environment and micro inputs such as cultural, security, economic, and diplomatic factors, has influenced the country's foreign policy towards Israel. The research results indicate that although changes in the geopolitical environment over the past decade have been effective in pushing India and Israel towards each other, under the influence of India's strategic culture, this change has occurred gradually and has led to the formation of the India-Israel strategic partnership. Introduction The foreign policy is usually influenced by various internal factors, including: geographical location, military power, national interests, security, economy, culture and nature of the political system, identity and religious and cultural values of a country, as well as structural requirements in the international environment and the regional environment. Since the foreign policy is constantly changing and evolving due to global changes, domestic developments and new challenges, its strategy may serve to maintain the status quo, improve the status quo or change the status quo. Meanwhile, India's foreign policy as an emerging power has undergone significant changes since the right-wing government of Narendra Modi came to power. These changes have been reflected in India's new policy towards West Asia, entitled "Thinking West" and increasing political, military and economic interactions with like-minded actors in the region such as Israel. The aim of this research is to identify the roots of change in India's foreign policy towards the West Asia region, and especially Israel, during the Narendra Modi era. Accordingly, the present study seeks to identify the change in India's foreign policy towards the West Asian region and Israel in light of the conceptual framework of strategic culture. Conceptual Framework This study will use the conceptual framework of strategic culture proposed by Alastair Johnson. According to Johnston, strategic culture consists of two main parts: one is related to the worldview of a nation, and the other is the operational aspect of dealing with the world in terms of national interests. The first includes a series of assumptions about the strategic environment (for example, the state of anarchy in international relations or the community of nations), while the second addresses the question of what role strategic culture in all its manifestations plays in the formulation of the final policy. The second part is the macro strategy, or secondary assumptions about operational policy that arise from the previous assumptions. For this study, defining strategic culture from Johnston's perspective as an intervening variable can better help us identify the strategic thinking behind India's foreign policy strategy towards Israel. Therefore, in line with Johnston's view, to examine the impact of strategic culture on India's foreign policy towards Israel during the Narendra Modi era, we will consider two inputs of the country's strategic culture at the macro and micro levels. These inputs include sources such as India's strategic environment; historical, cultural, and ideological legacy; security objectives; economic development goals; and diplomatic discourse that shape India's strategic behavior in the long term. Methodology This article is an evolutionary explanatory research. In evolutionary explanatory research, we explain the specific features of the subject of the research, namely the reliance of India’s foreign policy towards Israel on strategic partnership, by explaining how it has evolved and developed from an earlier stage, and for this purpose, we show the events through which India’s foreign policy has reached its current state. In this case, we will need a large number of detailed statements about the events that occurred during the period in question. Of course, it is clear that not all events of this period are mentioned, and the selection of events mentioned in this study is based on assumptions derived from the conceptual framework of strategic culture in terms of the perspective of Alastair Johnstone. In doing so, a qualitative method is used to analyze the collected data, and the research data has been collected using the documentary method and relying on library sources, articles and statements of the Ministry of External Affairs and Indian leaders. Accordingly, data related to India's international policy, and in particular, its foreign policy towards Israel under Narendra Modi (2014-2024), will be subjected to qualitative content analysis. Discussion The article argues that India’s strategic culture after independence has been reshaped by new macro inputs such as the country’s strategic environment and macro strategies during the Narendra Modi era, such that we are witnessing a transformation of India’s strategic culture from an idealistic-moral approach to a more realistic one. This change does not mean denying the role of strategic culture as a determining variable, but rather reinterpreting it in the context of Hindu nationalism. Thus, first of all, changes in India’s strategic environment, namely the rise of China and the Indian authorities’ concerns about a unipolar Asian order, led India during the Narendra Modi era to abandon Nehru’s worldview and the long-standing and conservative policy of non-alignment and form new partnerships with like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific region. Developments in the West Asian region, such as the decline in the importance of Palestine for the Arab world and the weakness of Arab powers after the 2011 Arab uprisings, and the normalization of relations between the Persian Gulf Arab states and Israel in the form of the Abraham Accords, further facilitated the rapprochement of India and Israel. In addition, micro-level factors such as the ideological convergence between the Hindu nationalist movement and the Zionist movement; the importance of Israel as a source of technology in India's economic development policies; the shared perception of security threats between Tel Aviv and New Delhi; India's need for advanced Israeli military equipment; and the important position of Israel in India's new diplomatic discourse have had a major impact on the growing proximity of the two sides since 2014. Conclusion The research findings show that the strategic partnership between India and Israel under the Narendra Modi government is, rather than the result of structural changes in the international system or the political decision of the country's leadership, the result of the development of India's strategic culture through three stages: Nehruism (1947-1990), economic pragmatism (1990-2013), and cultural realism (from 2014 to the present). As a result, the rapprochement between India and Israel is not simply a tactical move and political decision, but rather a reflection of a cultural understanding of the country's new threats and opportunities in its strategic environment; in which Israel is seen as a strategic partner in the Modi government's grand strategy to achieve the status of an emerging power. The foreign policy is constantly changing and evolving under the influence of structural factors, internal dynamics, intentions and motivations of leaders. Meanwhile, India's foreign policy as an emerging power has undergone significant changes since the right-wing government of Narendra Modi came to power. These changes are reflected in India's new policy towards West Asia, titled "Thinking West" and increasing political, military and economic interactions with like-minded actors in the region such as Israel. The aim of this research is to identify the roots of change in India's foreign policy towards the West Asia region, and especially Israel, during the Narendra Modi era. This article is a descriptive analysis-based research and uses a qualitative method to analyze the collected data. The research data was collected using documentary methods and relying on library sources, articles and statements of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Indian leaders. The research findings show that India's strategic culture, influenced by macro inputs such as the strategic environment and micro inputs such as cultural, security, economic, and diplomatic factors, has influenced the country's foreign policy towards Israel. The research results indicate that although changes in the geopolitical environment over the past decade have been effective in pushing India and Israel towards each other, under the influence of India's strategic culture, this change has occurred gradually and has led to the formation of the India-Israel strategic partnership. Introduction The foreign policy is usually influenced by various internal factors, including: geographical location, military power, national interests, security, economy, culture and nature of the political system, identity and religious and cultural values of a country, as well as structural requirements in the international environment and the regional environment. Since the foreign policy is constantly changing and evolving due to global changes, domestic developments and new challenges, its strategy may serve to maintain the status quo, improve the status quo or change the status quo. Meanwhile, India's foreign policy as an emerging power has undergone significant changes since the right-wing government of Narendra Modi came to power. These changes have been reflected in India's new policy towards West Asia, entitled "Thinking West" and increasing political, military and economic interactions with like-minded actors in the region such as Israel. The aim of this research is to identify the roots of change in India's foreign policy towards the West Asia region, and especially Israel, during the Narendra Modi era. Accordingly, the present study seeks to identify the change in India's foreign policy towards the West Asian region and Israel in light of the conceptual framework of strategic culture. Conceptual Framework This study will use the conceptual framework of strategic culture proposed by Alastair Johnson. According to Johnston, strategic culture consists of two main parts: one is related to the worldview of a nation, and the other is the operational aspect of dealing with the world in terms of national interests. The first includes a series of assumptions about the strategic environment (for example, the state of anarchy in international relations or the community of nations), while the second addresses the question of what role strategic culture in all its manifestations plays in the formulation of the final policy. The second part is the macro strategy, or secondary assumptions about operational policy that arise from the previous assumptions. For this study, defining strategic culture from Johnston's perspective as an intervening variable can better help us identify the strategic thinking behind India's foreign policy strategy towards Israel. Therefore, in line with Johnston's view, to examine the impact of strategic culture on India's foreign policy towards Israel during the Narendra Modi era, we will consider two inputs of the country's strategic culture at the macro and micro levels. These inputs include sources such as India's strategic environment; historical, cultural, and ideological legacy; security objectives; economic development goals; and diplomatic discourse that shape India's strategic behavior in the long term. Methodology This article is an evolutionary explanatory research. In evolutionary explanatory research, we explain the specific features of the subject of the research, namely the reliance of India’s foreign policy towards Israel on strategic partnership, by explaining how it has evolved and developed from an earlier stage, and for this purpose, we show the events through which India’s foreign policy has reached its current state. In this case, we will need a large number of detailed statements about the events that occurred during the period in question. Of course, it is clear that not all events of this period are mentioned, and the selection of events mentioned in this study is based on assumptions derived from the conceptual framework of strategic culture in terms of the perspective of Alastair Johnstone. In doing so, a qualitative method is used to analyze the collected data, and the research data has been collected using the documentary method and relying on library sources, articles and statements of the Ministry of External Affairs and Indian leaders. Accordingly, data related to India's international policy, and in particular, its foreign policy towards Israel under Narendra Modi (2014-2024), will be subjected to qualitative content analysis. Discussion The article argues that India’s strategic culture after independence has been reshaped by new macro inputs such as the country’s strategic environment and macro strategies during the Narendra Modi era, such that we are witnessing a transformation of India’s strategic culture from an idealistic-moral approach to a more realistic one. This change does not mean denying the role of strategic culture as a determining variable, but rather reinterpreting it in the context of Hindu nationalism. Thus, first of all, changes in India’s strategic environment, namely the rise of China and the Indian authorities’ concerns about a unipolar Asian order, led India during the Narendra Modi era to abandon Nehru’s worldview and the long-standing and conservative policy of non-alignment and form new partnerships with like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific region. Developments in the West Asian region, such as the decline in the importance of Palestine for the Arab world and the weakness of Arab powers after the 2011 Arab uprisings, and the normalization of relations between the Persian Gulf Arab states and Israel in the form of the Abraham Accords, further facilitated the rapprochement of India and Israel. In addition, micro-level factors such as the ideological convergence between the Hindu nationalist movement and the Zionist movement; the importance of Israel as a source of technology in India's economic development policies; the shared perception of security threats between Tel Aviv and New Delhi; India's need for advanced Israeli military equipment; and the important position of Israel in India's new diplomatic discourse have had a major impact on the growing proximity of the two sides since 2014. Conclusion The research findings show that the strategic partnership between India and Israel under the Narendra Modi government is, rather than the result of structural changes in the international system or the political decision of the country's leadership, the result of the development of India's strategic culture through three stages: Nehruism (1947-1990), economic pragmatism (1990-2013), and cultural realism (from 2014 to the present). As a result, the rapprochement between India and Israel is not simply a tactical move and political decision, but rather a reflection of a cultural understanding of the country's new threats and opportunities in its strategic environment; in which Israel is seen as a strategic partner in the Modi government's grand strategy to achieve the status of an emerging power.

https://www.iisajournals.ir/article_234555_445fc21ea7ad0ad86c25a7de40454458.pdf

The Iranian Association of International Studies International Relations Researches 2251-8444 15 3 2025 11 22 Women on the Battlefield: Experiences and Challenges in the Israeli Army Women on the Battlefield: Experiences and Challenges in the Israeli Army 105 128 229056 10.22034/irr.2025.466234.2565 FA Ehsan Ejazi Lecturer at Technical and Vocational University, Tehran, Iran 0000-0003-3686-1913 Mahsa Ahmadian M.A. in American Studies at Allameh Tabataba'i University 0000-0003-2004-1072 Journal Article 2024 07 04 Throughout human history, women have been symbols of peace, compassion, emotions, and pacifism. Although feminists may challenge the accuracy of this statement, the direct presence of men and the indirect presence of women in most wars have led to men being labeled as symbols of violence and women as symbols of nurturing. Nevertheless, in the 21st century, the presence of women on the battlefront has become an important issue in the military strategies of world powers. The question of whether the world's armies can deploy female soldiers on the front lines has become a challenging issue for military commanders. Israel is one of the political regimes that, without any hesitation, employs women on the battlefield. Accordingly, the question of this article is as follows: What factor or factors have led some governments, such as the Israeli regime, to permit the use of women on the battlefield? The research hypothesis is that the necessity of regime survival and the shortage of military officers, if recruitment were limited to men only, have caused Israel to abandon gender policy in soldier recruitment and call both men and women to serve in the army. The findings of the present research indicate that security needs—such as the need for survival, lack of strategic depth, demographic challenges, and expansionist policies—have compelled this regime to disregard the social harms caused by the presence of women on the battlefield, overlook the notion of women's pacifism, and utilize all its military capacities, including female combat forces, in its wars. Introduction This study examines the participation of women in the Israeli military and the challenges arising from it. Contrary to traditional religious teachings that confined women to domestic and familial roles, Israel—since its establishment—has been compelled by security and demographic pressures to conscript women into military service. The central research question is why Israel, unlike many other states, has legitimized the deployment of women in combat roles. The main hypothesis suggests that the need for survival, demographic constraints, and Israel’s expansionist policies have led the state to integrate women into its armed forces. Theoretical Framework The research is grounded in feminist theory and scholarship on gender and war. Armies are conceptualized as male-dominated institutions that reproduce hegemonic masculinity. Feminist theorists argue that excluding women from military and political processes reinforces systemic inequalities. Concepts such as “militarized femininity” and “politicized femininity” are applied to analyze Israeli women’s military role. In addition, the study draws on UN Security Council Resolution 1325, which legitimizes the participation of women in security structures and peace processes. Methodology The research employs a qualitative methodology, relying on the analysis of official documents, military laws, demographic statistics, and prior academic studies on women in the Israeli military. The sources include official Israeli reports, demographic data, and international scholarly literature on gender and security. The approach combines documentary analysis with theoretical perspectives to assess the evolving role of women in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). Results & Discussion Findings highlight four key factors driving the integration of women in the Israeli military: 1. Survival and Security Needs: Continuous threats from Hamas and Hezbollah have compelled Israel to mobilize its entire human capital, including women. 2. Lack of Strategic Depth: Israel’s limited geography necessitates preemptive and external wars, thereby requiring maximum utilization of both male and female soldiers. 3. Demographic Challenges: The low participation of ultra-Orthodox Jewish men and Arab citizens in military service has forced the IDF to rely more heavily on women. 4. Expansionist Policies: Israel’s settlement policies and military presence in the West Bank and Gaza require sustained deployment, which has increased reliance on female soldiers. Despite these developments, women in the IDF continue to face gender-based discrimination, sexual harassment, and limited access to high-ranking command positions. While women are increasingly present in combat units, the military hierarchy remains largely male-dominated. Conclusions & Suggestions The study concludes that women’s military participation in Israel is not primarily the result of feminist achievements or gender equality movements but rather a consequence of structural necessities tied to security, demography, and expansionist state policies. Israel has had to overlook traditional notions of femininity and pacifism to ensure its survival and pursue military objectives. Nevertheless, entrenched patriarchal structures within the IDF continue to obstruct women’s advancement to senior leadership positions. Thus, women’s presence in the Israeli military should be understood more as a product of strategic necessity than as a triumph of feminist struggle. Throughout human history, women have been symbols of peace, compassion, emotions, and pacifism. Although feminists may challenge the accuracy of this statement, the direct presence of men and the indirect presence of women in most wars have led to men being labeled as symbols of violence and women as symbols of nurturing. Nevertheless, in the 21st century, the presence of women on the battlefront has become an important issue in the military strategies of world powers. The question of whether the world's armies can deploy female soldiers on the front lines has become a challenging issue for military commanders. Israel is one of the political regimes that, without any hesitation, employs women on the battlefield. Accordingly, the question of this article is as follows: What factor or factors have led some governments, such as the Israeli regime, to permit the use of women on the battlefield? The research hypothesis is that the necessity of regime survival and the shortage of military officers, if recruitment were limited to men only, have caused Israel to abandon gender policy in soldier recruitment and call both men and women to serve in the army. The findings of the present research indicate that security needs—such as the need for survival, lack of strategic depth, demographic challenges, and expansionist policies—have compelled this regime to disregard the social harms caused by the presence of women on the battlefield, overlook the notion of women's pacifism, and utilize all its military capacities, including female combat forces, in its wars. Introduction This study examines the participation of women in the Israeli military and the challenges arising from it. Contrary to traditional religious teachings that confined women to domestic and familial roles, Israel—since its establishment—has been compelled by security and demographic pressures to conscript women into military service. The central research question is why Israel, unlike many other states, has legitimized the deployment of women in combat roles. The main hypothesis suggests that the need for survival, demographic constraints, and Israel’s expansionist policies have led the state to integrate women into its armed forces. Theoretical Framework The research is grounded in feminist theory and scholarship on gender and war. Armies are conceptualized as male-dominated institutions that reproduce hegemonic masculinity. Feminist theorists argue that excluding women from military and political processes reinforces systemic inequalities. Concepts such as “militarized femininity” and “politicized femininity” are applied to analyze Israeli women’s military role. In addition, the study draws on UN Security Council Resolution 1325, which legitimizes the participation of women in security structures and peace processes. Methodology The research employs a qualitative methodology, relying on the analysis of official documents, military laws, demographic statistics, and prior academic studies on women in the Israeli military. The sources include official Israeli reports, demographic data, and international scholarly literature on gender and security. The approach combines documentary analysis with theoretical perspectives to assess the evolving role of women in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). Results & Discussion Findings highlight four key factors driving the integration of women in the Israeli military: 1. Survival and Security Needs: Continuous threats from Hamas and Hezbollah have compelled Israel to mobilize its entire human capital, including women. 2. Lack of Strategic Depth: Israel’s limited geography necessitates preemptive and external wars, thereby requiring maximum utilization of both male and female soldiers. 3. Demographic Challenges: The low participation of ultra-Orthodox Jewish men and Arab citizens in military service has forced the IDF to rely more heavily on women. 4. Expansionist Policies: Israel’s settlement policies and military presence in the West Bank and Gaza require sustained deployment, which has increased reliance on female soldiers. Despite these developments, women in the IDF continue to face gender-based discrimination, sexual harassment, and limited access to high-ranking command positions. While women are increasingly present in combat units, the military hierarchy remains largely male-dominated. Conclusions & Suggestions The study concludes that women’s military participation in Israel is not primarily the result of feminist achievements or gender equality movements but rather a consequence of structural necessities tied to security, demography, and expansionist state policies. Israel has had to overlook traditional notions of femininity and pacifism to ensure its survival and pursue military objectives. Nevertheless, entrenched patriarchal structures within the IDF continue to obstruct women’s advancement to senior leadership positions. Thus, women’s presence in the Israeli military should be understood more as a product of strategic necessity than as a triumph of feminist struggle.

https://www.iisajournals.ir/article_229056_1a2fb43a254abebe487fda9f83310dfa.pdf

The Iranian Association of International Studies International Relations Researches 2251-8444 15 3 2025 11 22 The Role of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in Iran’s Development Programe Process. The Role of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in Iran’s Development Programe Process. 129 147 230262 10.22034/irr.2025.532766.2721 FA Nabi Omidi Associate Professor of Management, Faculty of Management, Economics and Accounting, Payame Noor University(PNU), Tehran, Iran 0000-0001-6841-8743 Ayoub Menati Assistant Professor of Regional Studies, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, Ilam University, Ilam, Iran 0009-0005-2798-4614 Journal Article 2025 07 06 The purpose of this study is to examine the role of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) in the formation and implementation of Iran’s First Development Programe during the years 1949 to 1955. Adopting a historical–institutional approach and based on official documents and reports, the research analyzes the Bank’s involvement in planning, consultation, financing, and project evaluation related to the First Development Plan. The findings indicate that the loan expected from the World Bank, which was one of the two main intended sources of financing alongside oil revenues, was not realized due to the political upheavals following the nationalization of the oil industry and the subsequent crises. Nevertheless, the World Bank played a significant role in shaping the content of the plan and determining development priorities through advisory frameworks, the dispatch of expert missions, and the assessment of proposed projects. This collaboration not only influenced the institutional structure of the Plan Organization but also established Iran’s first direct experience of engagement with an international financial institution an experience which, although it fell short of fully achieving the plan’s objectives, strengthened the intellectual and institutional foundations of development planning in the country. Introduction Following the end of World War II and within the framework of the Bretton Woods Agreements (1944), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the main institution of the World Bank Group, was established with the objective of reconstructing war-torn economies and subsequently supporting the sustainable development of transitioning nations. The Bank’s primary mission was centered on granting long-term loans, providing technical advisory services, and supporting the creation of economic and institutional infrastructure. During this same period, in the late 1940s, Iran was taking its first steps toward formulating and implementing a centralized development planning system. Iran’s First Development Plan (1949-1955) was designed with ambitious goals, such as modernizing infrastructure, developing agriculture and industry, and improving social indicators. The intersection of these two trends(the emergence of an international financial institution and the beginning of development planning in Iran)forms the primary context of this research. The main objective of this article is to conduct a detailed investigation and analysis of the role of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in the formation, financing, and implementation of Iran’s first development plan between 1949 and 1955. The architects of the first plan based its financing on two main pillars: revenues from oil sales and a $250 million loan from the IBRD. However, major political upheavals, particularly the nationalization of the oil industry in 1951 and the subsequent international crises, prevented the realization of this loan, effectively eliminating one of the main financial foundations of the plan. Despite this financial failure, Iran’s engagement with the World Bank was not limited to loan negotiations. Through dispatching expert missions, collaborating with international consulting firms, and providing evaluation frameworks, the Bank left a profound and lasting impact on shaping the plan’s content, setting development priorities, and establishing the institutional structure for planning in Iran, namely the “Plan Organization.” Adopting a historical-institutional approach, this study explores the multifaceted dimensions of this interaction and demonstrates how a failed financial collaboration transformed into a foundational experience for strengthening the intellectual and institutional underpinnings of development in the country. Theoretical Framework This research is based on a “historical institutionalism” approach and the related literature on the role of international financial organizations in the development of nations. The role of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in the development policies and programs of developing countries has been a significant focus for researchers of the historical institutionalism school. Studies show that this bank, in addition to its traditional role in financing projects, has evolved into a policy designer and institutional architect in borrowing countries. Through conditionality and the transfer of specific models, it contributes to the formation of particular development structures and paths. According to these findings, a phenomenon known as “path dependency” causes the bank to continue replicating old development patterns in different countries, even in the face of changing environments and the inefficiency of these models. Methodology This research was conducted using a “Historical-Institutional Analysis” approach. This framework allows the researcher to simultaneously analyze the interaction between historical events (such as the nationalization of the oil industry) and institutional structures (such as the laws of the Plan Organization or the rules of the World Bank). This makes it possible to more accurately identify the process of the formation, consolidation, and change in the World Bank’s role in Iran’s development policymaking. The primary data for the research were collected from first-hand and archival sources. These include official documents such as the annual reports of the World Bank, minutes of the Iranian Council of Ministers, official correspondence between the Iranian government and the Bank, reports from international consulting firms, and laws passed by the National Consultative Assembly . These documents enable a precise reconstruction of the chain of events and an objective assessment of the Bank’s role. The main methods for data analysis were “qualitative content analysis” and “comparative analysis” of the documents. Through these methods, the dominant development discourses, power structures, and institutional patterns that took shape during that period were identified. Additionally, to supplement the historical and conceptual context, credible secondary sources, including books and research articles on Iran’s economic history and the performance of the World Bank, have been utilized. Results & Discussion The findings of the research indicate that the role of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in Iran’s First Development Plan had two distinctly different facets: a “failed” financial role and an “effective” advisory and institution-building role. 1. Failure in Financing: The First Development Plan, with a budget of 21 billion Rials, was heavily dependent on two sources of revenue: oil income (37.1%) and the World Bank loan (31.9%). With the nationalization of the oil industry in 1951, sanctions by Great Britain and its allies began, leading to a complete cut-off of oil revenues and a halt in loan negotiations with the World Bank. Adopting a conservative stance and influenced by international political pressure, the Bank made the disbursement of the loan conditional on the resolution of the oil dispute, effectively retracting its commitment. This resulted in over 70% of the plan’s projected financial resources not being realized, and its implementation faced failure, to the extent that Abolhassan Ebtehaj officially declared the plan null and void after the 1953 coup d’état. This experience starkly demonstrated the extreme vulnerability of planning reliant on uncontrollable foreign financial resources. 2. Success in Institution-Building and Knowledge Transfer: Despite the financial failure, the World Bank’s impact in the institutional and intellectual spheres is undeniable. The Bank had conditioned the loan on the presentation of a well-documented and technical plan. This requirement compelled the Iranian government to hire reputable international consulting firms like Morrison-Knudsen and Overseas Consultants, Inc. The reports from these firms, based on technical and statistical studies, provided for the first time a scientific and modern framework for infrastructure development (dams, roads, ports), agricultural mechanization, and industrial development. More importantly, the recommendations of these consultants and the Bank’s emphasis on the need for an independent body to oversee the plan’s implementation led to the establishment of the “Provisional Plan Organization” in 1948. This organization, which later evolved into the “Plan and Budget Organization,” became the backbone of Iran’s development planning system for decades to come. In effect, the engagement with the World Bank introduced the concept of “scientific planning” into Iran’s political and economic lexicon and laid the foundation for a bureaucratic-technocratic structure to manage the country’s development. In conclusion, although the First Development Plan failed to achieve its implementation goals, it served as a historic “learning experience” and a turning point in Iran’s development history. This experience showed that international institutions can profoundly influence a country’s development path even without direct financial participation, through the transfer of intellectual, technical, and institutional models. This institutional legacy stands as the most significant achievement of Iran’s engagement with the World Bank during that historical juncture. Conclusions & Suggestions This historical-institutional research demonstrated that the role of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) in Iran’s First Development Plan (1949-1955) was dual and contradictory. On one hand, in the financial dimension, the World Bank, influenced by political pressures arising from the oil nationalization crisis, reneged on its commitments to finance the plan. This action, which eliminated one of the two main pillars of the plan’s budget, led to its implementation failure and exposed the severe vulnerability of a planning system reliant on untrustworthy external resources.On the other hand, in the institutional and intellectual dimensions, the engagement with the World Bank proved to be a foundational success. The Bank’s loan conditionalities steered the Iranian government towards employing international consultants and formulating a modern, technically data-driven plan. This process yielded two lasting achievements: first, the establishment of the “Plan Organization” as Iran’s first specialized and independent development planning institution, which became the country’s intellectual engine for development for decades; and second, the introduction of the discourse of “scientific planning” into Iran’s managerial and economic lexicon.Therefore, despite failing to achieve its physical objectives, the First Development Plan became a turning point in Iran’s institutional history. This experience illustrates that the influence of international financial organizations extends beyond capital infusion; through the transfer of knowledge, management models, and institutional conditionalities, they can profoundly shape a country’s long-term development trajectory (path dependency). The primary legacy of this period was not the unbuilt roads and dams, but the foundational establishment of a technocratic structure for planning that determined Iran’s development destiny in subsequent eras. Based on the findings of this research, the following suggestions are offered for policymakers and future researchers: For Development Policymakers: Diversify Financial Sources: To mitigate the vulnerability of development plans to political and economic shocks, reliance on one or two revenue sources (especially external or single-product export-dependent sources) should be replaced by a diverse portfolio of domestic and international resources. Strengthen Institutional Resilience: Planning institutions must be designed to maintain their functional and technical independence against domestic and international political pressures. This requires transparency, accountability, and a robust legal foundation. Smart Management of International Engagements: In collaborating with international institutions, a precise balance must be struck between leveraging their technical knowledge and expertise and preserving national policymaking autonomy. The purpose of this study is to examine the role of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) in the formation and implementation of Iran’s First Development Programe during the years 1949 to 1955. Adopting a historical–institutional approach and based on official documents and reports, the research analyzes the Bank’s involvement in planning, consultation, financing, and project evaluation related to the First Development Plan. The findings indicate that the loan expected from the World Bank, which was one of the two main intended sources of financing alongside oil revenues, was not realized due to the political upheavals following the nationalization of the oil industry and the subsequent crises. Nevertheless, the World Bank played a significant role in shaping the content of the plan and determining development priorities through advisory frameworks, the dispatch of expert missions, and the assessment of proposed projects. This collaboration not only influenced the institutional structure of the Plan Organization but also established Iran’s first direct experience of engagement with an international financial institution an experience which, although it fell short of fully achieving the plan’s objectives, strengthened the intellectual and institutional foundations of development planning in the country. Introduction Following the end of World War II and within the framework of the Bretton Woods Agreements (1944), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the main institution of the World Bank Group, was established with the objective of reconstructing war-torn economies and subsequently supporting the sustainable development of transitioning nations. The Bank’s primary mission was centered on granting long-term loans, providing technical advisory services, and supporting the creation of economic and institutional infrastructure. During this same period, in the late 1940s, Iran was taking its first steps toward formulating and implementing a centralized development planning system. Iran’s First Development Plan (1949-1955) was designed with ambitious goals, such as modernizing infrastructure, developing agriculture and industry, and improving social indicators. The intersection of these two trends(the emergence of an international financial institution and the beginning of development planning in Iran)forms the primary context of this research. The main objective of this article is to conduct a detailed investigation and analysis of the role of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in the formation, financing, and implementation of Iran’s first development plan between 1949 and 1955. The architects of the first plan based its financing on two main pillars: revenues from oil sales and a $250 million loan from the IBRD. However, major political upheavals, particularly the nationalization of the oil industry in 1951 and the subsequent international crises, prevented the realization of this loan, effectively eliminating one of the main financial foundations of the plan. Despite this financial failure, Iran’s engagement with the World Bank was not limited to loan negotiations. Through dispatching expert missions, collaborating with international consulting firms, and providing evaluation frameworks, the Bank left a profound and lasting impact on shaping the plan’s content, setting development priorities, and establishing the institutional structure for planning in Iran, namely the “Plan Organization.” Adopting a historical-institutional approach, this study explores the multifaceted dimensions of this interaction and demonstrates how a failed financial collaboration transformed into a foundational experience for strengthening the intellectual and institutional underpinnings of development in the country. Theoretical Framework This research is based on a “historical institutionalism” approach and the related literature on the role of international financial organizations in the development of nations. The role of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in the development policies and programs of developing countries has been a significant focus for researchers of the historical institutionalism school. Studies show that this bank, in addition to its traditional role in financing projects, has evolved into a policy designer and institutional architect in borrowing countries. Through conditionality and the transfer of specific models, it contributes to the formation of particular development structures and paths. According to these findings, a phenomenon known as “path dependency” causes the bank to continue replicating old development patterns in different countries, even in the face of changing environments and the inefficiency of these models. Methodology This research was conducted using a “Historical-Institutional Analysis” approach. This framework allows the researcher to simultaneously analyze the interaction between historical events (such as the nationalization of the oil industry) and institutional structures (such as the laws of the Plan Organization or the rules of the World Bank). This makes it possible to more accurately identify the process of the formation, consolidation, and change in the World Bank’s role in Iran’s development policymaking. The primary data for the research were collected from first-hand and archival sources. These include official documents such as the annual reports of the World Bank, minutes of the Iranian Council of Ministers, official correspondence between the Iranian government and the Bank, reports from international consulting firms, and laws passed by the National Consultative Assembly . These documents enable a precise reconstruction of the chain of events and an objective assessment of the Bank’s role. The main methods for data analysis were “qualitative content analysis” and “comparative analysis” of the documents. Through these methods, the dominant development discourses, power structures, and institutional patterns that took shape during that period were identified. Additionally, to supplement the historical and conceptual context, credible secondary sources, including books and research articles on Iran’s economic history and the performance of the World Bank, have been utilized. Results & Discussion The findings of the research indicate that the role of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in Iran’s First Development Plan had two distinctly different facets: a “failed” financial role and an “effective” advisory and institution-building role. 1. Failure in Financing: The First Development Plan, with a budget of 21 billion Rials, was heavily dependent on two sources of revenue: oil income (37.1%) and the World Bank loan (31.9%). With the nationalization of the oil industry in 1951, sanctions by Great Britain and its allies began, leading to a complete cut-off of oil revenues and a halt in loan negotiations with the World Bank. Adopting a conservative stance and influenced by international political pressure, the Bank made the disbursement of the loan conditional on the resolution of the oil dispute, effectively retracting its commitment. This resulted in over 70% of the plan’s projected financial resources not being realized, and its implementation faced failure, to the extent that Abolhassan Ebtehaj officially declared the plan null and void after the 1953 coup d’état. This experience starkly demonstrated the extreme vulnerability of planning reliant on uncontrollable foreign financial resources. 2. Success in Institution-Building and Knowledge Transfer: Despite the financial failure, the World Bank’s impact in the institutional and intellectual spheres is undeniable. The Bank had conditioned the loan on the presentation of a well-documented and technical plan. This requirement compelled the Iranian government to hire reputable international consulting firms like Morrison-Knudsen and Overseas Consultants, Inc. The reports from these firms, based on technical and statistical studies, provided for the first time a scientific and modern framework for infrastructure development (dams, roads, ports), agricultural mechanization, and industrial development. More importantly, the recommendations of these consultants and the Bank’s emphasis on the need for an independent body to oversee the plan’s implementation led to the establishment of the “Provisional Plan Organization” in 1948. This organization, which later evolved into the “Plan and Budget Organization,” became the backbone of Iran’s development planning system for decades to come. In effect, the engagement with the World Bank introduced the concept of “scientific planning” into Iran’s political and economic lexicon and laid the foundation for a bureaucratic-technocratic structure to manage the country’s development. In conclusion, although the First Development Plan failed to achieve its implementation goals, it served as a historic “learning experience” and a turning point in Iran’s development history. This experience showed that international institutions can profoundly influence a country’s development path even without direct financial participation, through the transfer of intellectual, technical, and institutional models. This institutional legacy stands as the most significant achievement of Iran’s engagement with the World Bank during that historical juncture. Conclusions & Suggestions This historical-institutional research demonstrated that the role of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) in Iran’s First Development Plan (1949-1955) was dual and contradictory. On one hand, in the financial dimension, the World Bank, influenced by political pressures arising from the oil nationalization crisis, reneged on its commitments to finance the plan. This action, which eliminated one of the two main pillars of the plan’s budget, led to its implementation failure and exposed the severe vulnerability of a planning system reliant on untrustworthy external resources.On the other hand, in the institutional and intellectual dimensions, the engagement with the World Bank proved to be a foundational success. The Bank’s loan conditionalities steered the Iranian government towards employing international consultants and formulating a modern, technically data-driven plan. This process yielded two lasting achievements: first, the establishment of the “Plan Organization” as Iran’s first specialized and independent development planning institution, which became the country’s intellectual engine for development for decades; and second, the introduction of the discourse of “scientific planning” into Iran’s managerial and economic lexicon.Therefore, despite failing to achieve its physical objectives, the First Development Plan became a turning point in Iran’s institutional history. This experience illustrates that the influence of international financial organizations extends beyond capital infusion; through the transfer of knowledge, management models, and institutional conditionalities, they can profoundly shape a country’s long-term development trajectory (path dependency). The primary legacy of this period was not the unbuilt roads and dams, but the foundational establishment of a technocratic structure for planning that determined Iran’s development destiny in subsequent eras. Based on the findings of this research, the following suggestions are offered for policymakers and future researchers: For Development Policymakers: Diversify Financial Sources: To mitigate the vulnerability of development plans to political and economic shocks, reliance on one or two revenue sources (especially external or single-product export-dependent sources) should be replaced by a diverse portfolio of domestic and international resources. Strengthen Institutional Resilience: Planning institutions must be designed to maintain their functional and technical independence against domestic and international political pressures. This requires transparency, accountability, and a robust legal foundation. Smart Management of International Engagements: In collaborating with international institutions, a precise balance must be struck between leveraging their technical knowledge and expertise and preserving national policymaking autonomy.

https://www.iisajournals.ir/article_230262_2f8ba741487f08c73bd91bbbb47f6642.pdf

The Iranian Association of International Studies International Relations Researches 2251-8444 15 3 2025 11 22 An Analysis of the Political and Military Consequences of the Russia–Ukraine War on NATO’s Regional Policies An Analysis of the Political and Military Consequences of the Russia–Ukraine War on NATO’s Regional Policies 149 165 239809 10.22034/irr.2026.554321.2789 FA Hadi Zoka Dadgostar Ph.D Student, Department of Political Science, Faculty of Law & Political Science, Central Tehran Branch, Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran. 0009-0008-3146-0823 Habibollah Abolhassan Shirazi Professor of International Relations,, Faculty of Law & Political Science,, Central Tehran Branch,, Islamic Azad University,, Tehran,, Iran 0009-0005-3757-8492 Rohoallah Ghasemian ‏Assistant Professor of International Relations, Faculty of Law & Political Science, Central Tehran Branch, Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran Journal Article 2025 10 19 The Russia–Ukraine conflict represents one of the most significant security crises of the twenty-first century, exerting profound impacts on the international order and, in particular, on the regional policies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This war has not only escalated tensions between Russia and the West to unprecedented levels but has also led to a redefinition of NATO’s political and military strategies and objectives. The importance of this issue stems from the fact that Europe is once again witnessing a large-scale war within its borders, compelling NATO to adopt new policies aimed at deterrence and the preservation of internal cohesion. The central research question is: What are the political and military consequences of the Russia–Ukraine conflict for NATO’s regional policies? The study’s hypothesis suggests that the Ukraine crisis, by creating a shared sense of threat to European security, has strengthened NATO’s political cohesion, reshaped its military posture, and expanded its geographic influence in Eastern Europe. Research findings indicate that, in response to this crisis, NATO has reinforced its military presence along its eastern borders, deployed new defense systems and equipment, and enhanced intelligence and operational cooperation among its members. Politically, greater unity and convergence have emerged among member states, accelerating the accession processes of new countries such as Finland and Sweden. Overall, the Russia–Ukraine war has driven NATO toward a more active, militarized, and east-oriented strategic posture—a trajectory with lasting implications for the global balance of power and the future of European security. Introduction The Russia–Ukraine conflict represents one of the most consequential geopolitical crises of the early twenty-first century, profoundly reshaping Europe’s security architecture and fundamentally altering NATO’s political and military strategies. Russia’s invasion in February 2022 marked a decisive turning point, compelling NATO—after decades focused on out-of-area operations—to confront a direct threat to its borders and reassess priorities related to collective defense, deterrence, and rapid response. Politically, the war has revitalized the discourse on containing Russia and strengthened NATO’s commitments along its eastern flank, most notably through the accession of Finland in 2023 and Sweden in 2024. Militarily, NATO has shifted toward active deterrence by increasing defense spending, reinforcing rapid reaction forces, deploying additional troops and equipment in Eastern Europe, and expanding large-scale joint exercises, while also enhancing cyber defense and counter-hybrid capabilities. Beyond Europe, the crisis has transformed NATO into a more complex geopolitical actor, influencing policies in the Black Sea, the Caucasus, and Central Asia, and deepening cooperation with Indo-Pacific partners such as Japan, South Korea, and Australia. Against this backdrop, the central research question is: to what extent has the Russia–Ukraine war contributed to the strengthening and transformation of NATO’s regional policies? The main hypothesis posits that the escalation of the conflict has directly driven the consolidation and expansion of NATO’s political and military posture, examined through indicators such as force deployment, defense budgets, military exercises, alliance enlargement, and emerging security capabilities. Theoretical Framework This study examines the political and military consequences of the Russia–Ukraine war for NATO’s regional policies using an analytical–explanatory approach grounded in selected International Relations theories. The framework guides the formulation of research questions, hypotheses, and testable criteria. Offensive realism, defensive realism, and neoliberal institutionalism serve as the main theoretical lenses, while Russia’s actions and NATO’s responses are treated as dependent variables. From the offensive realism perspective, the anarchic international system and uncertainty about other states’ intentions drive great powers to maximize relative power and pursue regional hegemony. The key question is whether the war reflects a structural response to NATO’s eastward expansion. The hypothesis posits that as Russia’s perceived threat from NATO grows, its likelihood of using hard-power measures to protect regional influence increases. Testing criteria include efforts to assert regional dominance, reliance on military force, and heightened security competition with NATO. Defensive realism emphasizes that states prioritize security and survival, and overexpansion is costly. The relevant question is whether Russia’s actions were preventive or reactive. The hypothesis suggests that if behavior is defensive, military operations would be limited and deterrence-oriented. Indicators include operational scale, deployment patterns, and pre-war diplomatic initiatives. Neoliberal institutionalism focuses on the role of institutions in managing conflicts and promoting cooperation. The main question is how NATO has responded to the Ukraine crisis. The hypothesis proposes that increased threats strengthen NATO’s cohesion, enabling collective mechanisms to raise costs for Russia’s revisionist behavior. Criteria include institutional coordination, enlargement, extra-regional partnerships, and multilateral sanctions. Methodology The study uses a descriptive–analytical and explanatory design, combining qualitative and quantitative data. Sources include official documents from NATO, the EU, and the UN Security Council, media and analytical publications, and military/security statistics. Analysis employs an integrated framework of offensive realism, regional order theory, regional security theory, neoliberal institutionalism, and modern deterrence theory. This approach allows for a multi-dimensional understanding of the geopolitical, security, and institutional dynamics of the Ukraine crisis and NATO’s responses, linking empirical evidence to theoretical predictions and enhancing the study’s explanatory power. Discussion The findings indicate that the Russia–Ukraine war has profoundly reshaped NATO’s regional policies and strategic posture. Politically, the crisis has strengthened internal cohesion among member states, reducing previous disagreements over defense spending and security responsibilities. NATO’s focus has shifted toward Europe and the Eastern flank, while the accession of Finland (2023) and Sweden (2024) has expanded the alliance’s borders and reinforced collective defense. The containment of Russia has reemerged as a central strategic objective, reflecting a renewed consensus on shared security threats. Militarily, NATO has significantly increased its defense budget, surpassing $1.5 trillion in 2024, and transformed its Eastern flank deployments from symbolic presence to active, long-term deterrence. Emphasis on hybrid and modern warfare—including cyber, missile, and intelligence capabilities—combined with larger, multidimensional joint exercises, has substantially enhanced operational readiness and the ability to respond to complex threats. At the regional and geopolitical level, NATO has extended its influence across Eastern Europe and the Baltic region, while strengthening military and intelligence partnerships with Ukraine, Georgia, and transatlantic allies. Finland and Sweden now play pivotal roles in redefining NATO’s forward security line, positioning the alliance to respond proactively to potential escalation or expansion of the conflict. Collectively, these developments indicate that NATO has transitioned from a posture of “minimal deterrence” to “active, multidimensional, and long-term deterrence.” The structural, political, and military transformations triggered by the Ukraine war are likely to have enduring implications for European security, shaping NATO’s strategic priorities and operational practices for the foreseeable future. Conclusion The Russia–Ukraine war has marked a turning point in European security and NATO’s regional posture. Evidence from defense budgets, unit deployments, alliance enlargement, and strategic policies shows that NATO has shifted from “minimal deterrence” to “active, permanent, and multidimensional deterrence.” Structurally, NATO’s geopolitical position has strengthened: Finland’s accession doubled the alliance’s direct border with Russia, collective defense cohesion improved, and transatlantic cooperation reached unprecedented levels. Militarily, NATO’s 2024 defense budget exceeded $1.5 trillion, the number of members meeting the 2% GDP defense target rose from 3 to 18, Eastern flank units expanded from 4 to 8 permanent battle groups, and exercises now simulate realistic scenarios aligned with potential Russian aggression. Theoretically, no single perspective fully explains the crisis. Offensive realism accounts for Russia’s initial actions, defensive realism clarifies threat perception, and neoliberal institutionalism best captures post-war institutional cohesion and trans-regional cooperation. Overall, the Ukraine conflict has generated a multilayered transformation in NATO and European security, spanning structural threats, military responses, and strengthened institutional frameworks, with enduring implications for regional stability. The Russia–Ukraine conflict represents one of the most significant security crises of the twenty-first century, exerting profound impacts on the international order and, in particular, on the regional policies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This war has not only escalated tensions between Russia and the West to unprecedented levels but has also led to a redefinition of NATO’s political and military strategies and objectives. The importance of this issue stems from the fact that Europe is once again witnessing a large-scale war within its borders, compelling NATO to adopt new policies aimed at deterrence and the preservation of internal cohesion. The central research question is: What are the political and military consequences of the Russia–Ukraine conflict for NATO’s regional policies? The study’s hypothesis suggests that the Ukraine crisis, by creating a shared sense of threat to European security, has strengthened NATO’s political cohesion, reshaped its military posture, and expanded its geographic influence in Eastern Europe. Research findings indicate that, in response to this crisis, NATO has reinforced its military presence along its eastern borders, deployed new defense systems and equipment, and enhanced intelligence and operational cooperation among its members. Politically, greater unity and convergence have emerged among member states, accelerating the accession processes of new countries such as Finland and Sweden. Overall, the Russia–Ukraine war has driven NATO toward a more active, militarized, and east-oriented strategic posture—a trajectory with lasting implications for the global balance of power and the future of European security. Introduction The Russia–Ukraine conflict represents one of the most consequential geopolitical crises of the early twenty-first century, profoundly reshaping Europe’s security architecture and fundamentally altering NATO’s political and military strategies. Russia’s invasion in February 2022 marked a decisive turning point, compelling NATO—after decades focused on out-of-area operations—to confront a direct threat to its borders and reassess priorities related to collective defense, deterrence, and rapid response. Politically, the war has revitalized the discourse on containing Russia and strengthened NATO’s commitments along its eastern flank, most notably through the accession of Finland in 2023 and Sweden in 2024. Militarily, NATO has shifted toward active deterrence by increasing defense spending, reinforcing rapid reaction forces, deploying additional troops and equipment in Eastern Europe, and expanding large-scale joint exercises, while also enhancing cyber defense and counter-hybrid capabilities. Beyond Europe, the crisis has transformed NATO into a more complex geopolitical actor, influencing policies in the Black Sea, the Caucasus, and Central Asia, and deepening cooperation with Indo-Pacific partners such as Japan, South Korea, and Australia. Against this backdrop, the central research question is: to what extent has the Russia–Ukraine war contributed to the strengthening and transformation of NATO’s regional policies? The main hypothesis posits that the escalation of the conflict has directly driven the consolidation and expansion of NATO’s political and military posture, examined through indicators such as force deployment, defense budgets, military exercises, alliance enlargement, and emerging security capabilities. Theoretical Framework This study examines the political and military consequences of the Russia–Ukraine war for NATO’s regional policies using an analytical–explanatory approach grounded in selected International Relations theories. The framework guides the formulation of research questions, hypotheses, and testable criteria. Offensive realism, defensive realism, and neoliberal institutionalism serve as the main theoretical lenses, while Russia’s actions and NATO’s responses are treated as dependent variables. From the offensive realism perspective, the anarchic international system and uncertainty about other states’ intentions drive great powers to maximize relative power and pursue regional hegemony. The key question is whether the war reflects a structural response to NATO’s eastward expansion. The hypothesis posits that as Russia’s perceived threat from NATO grows, its likelihood of using hard-power measures to protect regional influence increases. Testing criteria include efforts to assert regional dominance, reliance on military force, and heightened security competition with NATO. Defensive realism emphasizes that states prioritize security and survival, and overexpansion is costly. The relevant question is whether Russia’s actions were preventive or reactive. The hypothesis suggests that if behavior is defensive, military operations would be limited and deterrence-oriented. Indicators include operational scale, deployment patterns, and pre-war diplomatic initiatives. Neoliberal institutionalism focuses on the role of institutions in managing conflicts and promoting cooperation. The main question is how NATO has responded to the Ukraine crisis. The hypothesis proposes that increased threats strengthen NATO’s cohesion, enabling collective mechanisms to raise costs for Russia’s revisionist behavior. Criteria include institutional coordination, enlargement, extra-regional partnerships, and multilateral sanctions. Methodology The study uses a descriptive–analytical and explanatory design, combining qualitative and quantitative data. Sources include official documents from NATO, the EU, and the UN Security Council, media and analytical publications, and military/security statistics. Analysis employs an integrated framework of offensive realism, regional order theory, regional security theory, neoliberal institutionalism, and modern deterrence theory. This approach allows for a multi-dimensional understanding of the geopolitical, security, and institutional dynamics of the Ukraine crisis and NATO’s responses, linking empirical evidence to theoretical predictions and enhancing the study’s explanatory power. Discussion The findings indicate that the Russia–Ukraine war has profoundly reshaped NATO’s regional policies and strategic posture. Politically, the crisis has strengthened internal cohesion among member states, reducing previous disagreements over defense spending and security responsibilities. NATO’s focus has shifted toward Europe and the Eastern flank, while the accession of Finland (2023) and Sweden (2024) has expanded the alliance’s borders and reinforced collective defense. The containment of Russia has reemerged as a central strategic objective, reflecting a renewed consensus on shared security threats. Militarily, NATO has significantly increased its defense budget, surpassing $1.5 trillion in 2024, and transformed its Eastern flank deployments from symbolic presence to active, long-term deterrence. Emphasis on hybrid and modern warfare—including cyber, missile, and intelligence capabilities—combined with larger, multidimensional joint exercises, has substantially enhanced operational readiness and the ability to respond to complex threats. At the regional and geopolitical level, NATO has extended its influence across Eastern Europe and the Baltic region, while strengthening military and intelligence partnerships with Ukraine, Georgia, and transatlantic allies. Finland and Sweden now play pivotal roles in redefining NATO’s forward security line, positioning the alliance to respond proactively to potential escalation or expansion of the conflict. Collectively, these developments indicate that NATO has transitioned from a posture of “minimal deterrence” to “active, multidimensional, and long-term deterrence.” The structural, political, and military transformations triggered by the Ukraine war are likely to have enduring implications for European security, shaping NATO’s strategic priorities and operational practices for the foreseeable future. Conclusion The Russia–Ukraine war has marked a turning point in European security and NATO’s regional posture. Evidence from defense budgets, unit deployments, alliance enlargement, and strategic policies shows that NATO has shifted from “minimal deterrence” to “active, permanent, and multidimensional deterrence.” Structurally, NATO’s geopolitical position has strengthened: Finland’s accession doubled the alliance’s direct border with Russia, collective defense cohesion improved, and transatlantic cooperation reached unprecedented levels. Militarily, NATO’s 2024 defense budget exceeded $1.5 trillion, the number of members meeting the 2% GDP defense target rose from 3 to 18, Eastern flank units expanded from 4 to 8 permanent battle groups, and exercises now simulate realistic scenarios aligned with potential Russian aggression. Theoretically, no single perspective fully explains the crisis. Offensive realism accounts for Russia’s initial actions, defensive realism clarifies threat perception, and neoliberal institutionalism best captures post-war institutional cohesion and trans-regional cooperation. Overall, the Ukraine conflict has generated a multilayered transformation in NATO and European security, spanning structural threats, military responses, and strengthened institutional frameworks, with enduring implications for regional stability.

https://www.iisajournals.ir/article_239809_d80c626b5c30f97297afb717a39dc1f3.pdf

The Iranian Association of International Studies International Relations Researches 2251-8444 15 3 2025 11 22 Obama's personality traits and their impact on developments in international political economy (2012-2016) Obama's personality traits and their impact on developments in international political economy (2012-2016) 167 194 221767 10.22034/irr.2025.503694.2660 FA Arsalan Ghorbani Sheikhneshin Professor of International Relations, Faculty of Law and Political Science, Kharazmi University, Tehran, Iran Gholamreza Karimi Associate Professor of International Relations, Faculty of Law and Political Science, Kharazmi University, Tehran, Iran 0000-0003-3139-9504 Sayed Saeed Mirtorabi Associate Professor of International Relations, Faculty of Law and Political Science, Kharazmi University, Tehran, Iran Shirin Haddad Zand PhD Student of International Relations, Kharazmi University, Tehran, Iran Journal Article 2025 02 02 Developments in international political economy have always been shaped by the complex interaction of structural and individual factors. Therefore, besides structural factors and components, the missing point in explaining and examining international developments should be sought when considering political leaders as agents. Leaders have made influential decisions that contradict their country's previous behavioral traditions in the field of international economics, and Barack Obama, as one of the most prominent and influential contemporary political leaders, is an obvious example of the impact of personality in shaping international relations and international political economy. The present study seeks to answer this question: How did Obama's personality affect the international political economy in the 2012-2016 period? The answer to the hypothesis is examined using an explanatory-developmental method, which states that Barack Obama, the President of the United States of America in his second term (2012-2016), has influenced the policy orientations of international political economy in the period 2012-2016 through the perceptual patterns, leadership, and decision-making style, utilizing diplomacy and a willingness to compromise, and concluding multilateral agreements and economic and trade cooperation with other countries. Introduction Developments in international political economy are generally understood through the interaction of structural and agency-based variables. While structural approaches emphasize the role of international institutions, economic interdependence, and the distribution of power, agency-oriented perspectives focus on political leaders and their decision-making capacities. In recent decades, the growing complexity of global crises has increased scholarly attention toward the role of leaders as independent and influential actors in shaping international outcomes. Within this context, Barack Obama represents one of the most significant contemporary political figures whose personality traits substantially influenced international political economy during his second presidential term (2012–2016). Obama assumed leadership during a period characterized by the continuing consequences of the global financial crisis, rising competition between major powers, debates over globalization, and challenges to liberal economic governance. Unlike the unilateral and security-oriented approaches associated with the administration of George W. Bush, Obama pursued a more diplomatic, cooperative, and multilateral foreign economic policy. His administration emphasized international cooperation, institutional reform, trade agreements, and economic diplomacy as mechanisms for stabilizing and restructuring the global economy. This study seeks to answer the following question: how did Barack Obama’s personality traits, based on the Five-Factor Model of personality, influence international political economy between 2012 and 2016? The central argument of the article is that Obama’s personality traits—particularly openness to experience, agreeableness, emotional stability, and conscientiousness—played a decisive role in shaping his patterns of perception, leadership style, and foreign economic decision-making. Through diplomacy, compromise, multilateralism, and cooperative economic initiatives, Obama influenced the direction of international political economy during his second presidential term. Theoretical Framework The theoretical foundation of this study is based on the Five-Factor Model (FFM) of personality, also known as the “Big Five” model. This model categorizes personality into five broad dimensions: openness to experience, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism. The Five-Factor Model provides a systematic framework for understanding individual differences in behavior, cognition, and emotional responses. It has been widely applied in social, developmental, cultural, and political psychology to explain how personality shapes human behavior and decision-making processes. In political leadership studies, personality traits are considered essential variables that influence leaders’ perceptions of threats and opportunities, diplomatic behavior, crisis management, and strategic choices. Leaders with high openness to experience are generally more flexible, innovative, and willing to engage in international cooperation. Those with high agreeableness tend to prioritize compromise, negotiation, and peaceful conflict resolution. Conversely, leaders characterized by high neuroticism often display insecurity, aggression, and confrontational tendencies in foreign policy behavior. Applying this framework to Barack Obama reveals a political leader with high levels of openness, rationality, emotional stability, and diplomatic flexibility. Obama consistently demonstrated an inclination toward multilateral engagement, institutional cooperation, and pragmatic problem-solving. His leadership style reflected a belief in dialogue, international legitimacy, and shared economic responsibility. These characteristics distinguished him from more unilateral and militarized approaches associated with previous administrations. The study also incorporates an agency-structure perspective. While structural constraints such as domestic political pressures, global economic conditions, and institutional limitations influenced Obama’s policy choices, the research argues that personality functioned as an independent variable capable of shaping the interpretation of structural realities and the selection of policy responses. Therefore, international political economy cannot be understood solely through systemic explanations; individual leaders and their psychological characteristics also play a critical role in shaping international outcomes. Methodology This research employs an explanatory-genetic methodology aimed at identifying the causal relationship between Obama’s personality traits and developments in international political economy during the period 2012–2016. The explanatory dimension of the study seeks to analyze how personality characteristics influenced political and economic decision-making, while the genetic dimension focuses on tracing the evolution of Obama’s policies within their historical and institutional contexts.The study relies primarily on qualitative analysis, utilizing speeches, official documents, policy initiatives, international agreements, and scholarly literature related to Obama’s foreign economic policies. Particular attention is paid to Obama’s diplomatic discourse, leadership behavior, and economic initiatives during his second term. Comparative analysis is also employed to contrast Obama’s leadership style with that of George W. Bush in order to highlight the significance of personality differences in shaping policy orientations. The research examines several major policy areas, including multilateral economic cooperation, reforms in global financial institutions, trade agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), cooperation with the European Union, and Obama’s support for strengthening the International Monetary Fund (IMF). These cases provide empirical evidence for evaluating how personality traits translated into specific policy outcomes in international political economy. Discussion The findings of this study demonstrate that Barack Obama’s personality traits had a substantial influence on the direction and character of international political economy between 2012 and 2016. Obama’s high degree of openness to experience contributed to his support for multilateral economic governance and institutional reform. Rather than adopting isolationist or unilateral approaches, Obama viewed international cooperation as essential for achieving economic stability and sustainable growth. One of the clearest manifestations of Obama’s personality was his emphasis on diplomacy and compromise. His administration pursued negotiations and collaborative frameworks instead of coercive economic strategies. This orientation was reflected in efforts to strengthen cooperation with major economies, expand the role of international institutions, and reinforce global financial stability after the 2008 economic crisis. Obama supported increasing IMF resources and advocated reforms designed to enhance the legitimacy and effectiveness of global economic governance. Obama’s agreeableness and emotional stability also contributed to his preference for consensus-building and pragmatic engagement. Unlike leaders driven by ideological rigidity or aggressive nationalism, Obama sought balanced and rational solutions to international economic challenges. His administration promoted economic partnerships and trade agreements that emphasized mutual benefits and international integration. The Trans-Pacific Partnership represented an important example of Obama’s attempt to institutionalize economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region and strengthen the liberal international economic order. In addition, Obama’s leadership style reflected a high level of conscientiousness. His decision-making process was generally cautious, analytical, and evidence-based. Rather than reacting impulsively to international crises, Obama often relied on expert consultation and long-term strategic planning. This rational and measured approach contributed to greater predictability and stability in American foreign economic policy. The comparative analysis between Obama and George W. Bush further highlights the role of personality in international politics. Bush’s leadership style was more strongly associated with unilateralism, militarization, and security-centered policies. His aggressive responses to international threats reflected lower levels of agreeableness and higher tendencies toward confrontational behavior. In contrast, Obama’s cooperative and diplomatic orientation demonstrated how differing personality traits can produce fundamentally different approaches to international political economy even within the same structural environment. Nevertheless, the study acknowledges that Obama’s policies were not determined solely by personality factors. Domestic political polarization, congressional opposition, the rise of China, and global economic uncertainties imposed important constraints on his administration. However, Obama’s personality significantly shaped how these structural challenges were interpreted and managed. His leadership illustrates that political leaders are not merely passive actors responding to systemic pressures; they actively influence international realities through their perceptions, values, and behavioral tendencies. Conclusion This study concludes that Barack Obama’s personality traits, as interpreted through the Five-Factor Model, played a significant role in shaping international political economy during the years 2012–2016. Obama’s openness to experience, diplomatic flexibility, emotional stability, and cooperative orientation contributed to the promotion of multilateralism, institutional reform, and international economic collaboration. His leadership style encouraged negotiation, compromise, and global partnership rather than confrontation and unilateralism The findings demonstrate that personality should be considered an important analytical variable alongside structural factors in the study of international relations and political economy. Although international structures establish the general framework within which leaders operate, individual characteristics influence how leaders perceive opportunities and threats, formulate strategies, and implement policies. Obama’s presidency illustrates how a leader’s psychological profile can shape global economic governance and international cooperation during periods of uncertainty and transition. Ultimately, the research emphasizes the growing importance of leadership analysis in contemporary international studies. In an increasingly interconnected and crisis-prone world, political leaders possessing rationality, adaptability, and diplomatic capacity can significantly influence the stability and direction of international political economy.. Developments in international political economy have always been shaped by the complex interaction of structural and individual factors. Therefore, besides structural factors and components, the missing point in explaining and examining international developments should be sought when considering political leaders as agents. Leaders have made influential decisions that contradict their country's previous behavioral traditions in the field of international economics, and Barack Obama, as one of the most prominent and influential contemporary political leaders, is an obvious example of the impact of personality in shaping international relations and international political economy. The present study seeks to answer this question: How did Obama's personality affect the international political economy in the 2012-2016 period? The answer to the hypothesis is examined using an explanatory-developmental method, which states that Barack Obama, the President of the United States of America in his second term (2012-2016), has influenced the policy orientations of international political economy in the period 2012-2016 through the perceptual patterns, leadership, and decision-making style, utilizing diplomacy and a willingness to compromise, and concluding multilateral agreements and economic and trade cooperation with other countries. Introduction Developments in international political economy are generally understood through the interaction of structural and agency-based variables. While structural approaches emphasize the role of international institutions, economic interdependence, and the distribution of power, agency-oriented perspectives focus on political leaders and their decision-making capacities. In recent decades, the growing complexity of global crises has increased scholarly attention toward the role of leaders as independent and influential actors in shaping international outcomes. Within this context, Barack Obama represents one of the most significant contemporary political figures whose personality traits substantially influenced international political economy during his second presidential term (2012–2016). Obama assumed leadership during a period characterized by the continuing consequences of the global financial crisis, rising competition between major powers, debates over globalization, and challenges to liberal economic governance. Unlike the unilateral and security-oriented approaches associated with the administration of George W. Bush, Obama pursued a more diplomatic, cooperative, and multilateral foreign economic policy. His administration emphasized international cooperation, institutional reform, trade agreements, and economic diplomacy as mechanisms for stabilizing and restructuring the global economy. This study seeks to answer the following question: how did Barack Obama’s personality traits, based on the Five-Factor Model of personality, influence international political economy between 2012 and 2016? The central argument of the article is that Obama’s personality traits—particularly openness to experience, agreeableness, emotional stability, and conscientiousness—played a decisive role in shaping his patterns of perception, leadership style, and foreign economic decision-making. Through diplomacy, compromise, multilateralism, and cooperative economic initiatives, Obama influenced the direction of international political economy during his second presidential term. Theoretical Framework The theoretical foundation of this study is based on the Five-Factor Model (FFM) of personality, also known as the “Big Five” model. This model categorizes personality into five broad dimensions: openness to experience, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism. The Five-Factor Model provides a systematic framework for understanding individual differences in behavior, cognition, and emotional responses. It has been widely applied in social, developmental, cultural, and political psychology to explain how personality shapes human behavior and decision-making processes. In political leadership studies, personality traits are considered essential variables that influence leaders’ perceptions of threats and opportunities, diplomatic behavior, crisis management, and strategic choices. Leaders with high openness to experience are generally more flexible, innovative, and willing to engage in international cooperation. Those with high agreeableness tend to prioritize compromise, negotiation, and peaceful conflict resolution. Conversely, leaders characterized by high neuroticism often display insecurity, aggression, and confrontational tendencies in foreign policy behavior. Applying this framework to Barack Obama reveals a political leader with high levels of openness, rationality, emotional stability, and diplomatic flexibility. Obama consistently demonstrated an inclination toward multilateral engagement, institutional cooperation, and pragmatic problem-solving. His leadership style reflected a belief in dialogue, international legitimacy, and shared economic responsibility. These characteristics distinguished him from more unilateral and militarized approaches associated with previous administrations. The study also incorporates an agency-structure perspective. While structural constraints such as domestic political pressures, global economic conditions, and institutional limitations influenced Obama’s policy choices, the research argues that personality functioned as an independent variable capable of shaping the interpretation of structural realities and the selection of policy responses. Therefore, international political economy cannot be understood solely through systemic explanations; individual leaders and their psychological characteristics also play a critical role in shaping international outcomes. Methodology This research employs an explanatory-genetic methodology aimed at identifying the causal relationship between Obama’s personality traits and developments in international political economy during the period 2012–2016. The explanatory dimension of the study seeks to analyze how personality characteristics influenced political and economic decision-making, while the genetic dimension focuses on tracing the evolution of Obama’s policies within their historical and institutional contexts.The study relies primarily on qualitative analysis, utilizing speeches, official documents, policy initiatives, international agreements, and scholarly literature related to Obama’s foreign economic policies. Particular attention is paid to Obama’s diplomatic discourse, leadership behavior, and economic initiatives during his second term. Comparative analysis is also employed to contrast Obama’s leadership style with that of George W. Bush in order to highlight the significance of personality differences in shaping policy orientations. The research examines several major policy areas, including multilateral economic cooperation, reforms in global financial institutions, trade agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), cooperation with the European Union, and Obama’s support for strengthening the International Monetary Fund (IMF). These cases provide empirical evidence for evaluating how personality traits translated into specific policy outcomes in international political economy. Discussion The findings of this study demonstrate that Barack Obama’s personality traits had a substantial influence on the direction and character of international political economy between 2012 and 2016. Obama’s high degree of openness to experience contributed to his support for multilateral economic governance and institutional reform. Rather than adopting isolationist or unilateral approaches, Obama viewed international cooperation as essential for achieving economic stability and sustainable growth. One of the clearest manifestations of Obama’s personality was his emphasis on diplomacy and compromise. His administration pursued negotiations and collaborative frameworks instead of coercive economic strategies. This orientation was reflected in efforts to strengthen cooperation with major economies, expand the role of international institutions, and reinforce global financial stability after the 2008 economic crisis. Obama supported increasing IMF resources and advocated reforms designed to enhance the legitimacy and effectiveness of global economic governance. Obama’s agreeableness and emotional stability also contributed to his preference for consensus-building and pragmatic engagement. Unlike leaders driven by ideological rigidity or aggressive nationalism, Obama sought balanced and rational solutions to international economic challenges. His administration promoted economic partnerships and trade agreements that emphasized mutual benefits and international integration. The Trans-Pacific Partnership represented an important example of Obama’s attempt to institutionalize economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region and strengthen the liberal international economic order. In addition, Obama’s leadership style reflected a high level of conscientiousness. His decision-making process was generally cautious, analytical, and evidence-based. Rather than reacting impulsively to international crises, Obama often relied on expert consultation and long-term strategic planning. This rational and measured approach contributed to greater predictability and stability in American foreign economic policy. The comparative analysis between Obama and George W. Bush further highlights the role of personality in international politics. Bush’s leadership style was more strongly associated with unilateralism, militarization, and security-centered policies. His aggressive responses to international threats reflected lower levels of agreeableness and higher tendencies toward confrontational behavior. In contrast, Obama’s cooperative and diplomatic orientation demonstrated how differing personality traits can produce fundamentally different approaches to international political economy even within the same structural environment. Nevertheless, the study acknowledges that Obama’s policies were not determined solely by personality factors. Domestic political polarization, congressional opposition, the rise of China, and global economic uncertainties imposed important constraints on his administration. However, Obama’s personality significantly shaped how these structural challenges were interpreted and managed. His leadership illustrates that political leaders are not merely passive actors responding to systemic pressures; they actively influence international realities through their perceptions, values, and behavioral tendencies. Conclusion This study concludes that Barack Obama’s personality traits, as interpreted through the Five-Factor Model, played a significant role in shaping international political economy during the years 2012–2016. Obama’s openness to experience, diplomatic flexibility, emotional stability, and cooperative orientation contributed to the promotion of multilateralism, institutional reform, and international economic collaboration. His leadership style encouraged negotiation, compromise, and global partnership rather than confrontation and unilateralism The findings demonstrate that personality should be considered an important analytical variable alongside structural factors in the study of international relations and political economy. Although international structures establish the general framework within which leaders operate, individual characteristics influence how leaders perceive opportunities and threats, formulate strategies, and implement policies. Obama’s presidency illustrates how a leader’s psychological profile can shape global economic governance and international cooperation during periods of uncertainty and transition. Ultimately, the research emphasizes the growing importance of leadership analysis in contemporary international studies. In an increasingly interconnected and crisis-prone world, political leaders possessing rationality, adaptability, and diplomatic capacity can significantly influence the stability and direction of international political economy..

https://www.iisajournals.ir/article_221767_8df7c2efce9d4c996944484d00200d5b.pdf

The Iranian Association of International Studies International Relations Researches 2251-8444 15 3 2025 11 22 Social political effects of student movements in the conditions of livelihood crises in the light of global political economy evolution Social political effects of student movements in the conditions of livelihood crises in the light of global political economy evolution 195 219 243497 10.22034/irr.2026.581044.2848 FA Mohammad Parsa PhD student, Department of Sociology, Bu.C., Islamic Azad University, Bushehr, Iran Gholamreza Jafarinia Corresponding Author, Department of Sociology, Bu.C, Islamic Azad University, Bushehr, Iran. Moloud Keykhossravani Department of General Psychology, Bu.C, Islamic Azad University, Bushehr, Iran. Journal Article 2026 05 09 Student movements, as one of the most dynamic forms of collective action, have consistently been influenced by economic fluctuations and structural crises. This study aims to provide a sociological analysis of student movements within the context of living crises, examining their socio-political consequences in connection with international relations developments. The research methodology is qualitative, based on documentary analysis and theoretical synthesis, drawing upon key theories in the sociology of social movements. Findings indicate that living crises, by inducing a sense of relative deprivation and eroding social status, transform student welfare demands into structural and discourse-making protests. Meanwhile, variables such as globalization, international austerity policies, and new communication technologies act as catalysts for the expansion and transnationalization of these movements. Furthermore, the results suggest that the link between domestic grievances and global legal norms enhances students’ bargaining power against power structures and leads to the reconstruction of social capital within the university environment. Ultimately, the study concludes that student movements during living crises are more than just a simple economic reaction; they represent a rational response to institutional inefficiencies and an endeavor toward social justice and democratization within the framework of the global system and interdependence. By redefining the state-nation relationship, these movements function as drivers of structural change in modern societies. Student movements, as one of the most dynamic forms of collective action, have consistently been influenced by economic fluctuations and structural crises. This study aims to provide a sociological analysis of student movements within the context of living crises, examining their socio-political consequences in connection with international relations developments. The research methodology is qualitative, based on documentary analysis and theoretical synthesis, drawing upon key theories in the sociology of social movements. Findings indicate that living crises, by inducing a sense of relative deprivation and eroding social status, transform student welfare demands into structural and discourse-making protests. Meanwhile, variables such as globalization, international austerity policies, and new communication technologies act as catalysts for the expansion and transnationalization of these movements. Furthermore, the results suggest that the link between domestic grievances and global legal norms enhances students’ bargaining power against power structures and leads to the reconstruction of social capital within the university environment. Ultimately, the study concludes that student movements during living crises are more than just a simple economic reaction; they represent a rational response to institutional inefficiencies and an endeavor toward social justice and democratization within the framework of the global system and interdependence. By redefining the state-nation relationship, these movements function as drivers of structural change in modern societies.

https://www.iisajournals.ir/article_243497_9fa6547a6459bb50bd0bd1cc84860fec.pdf

The Iranian Association of International Studies International Relations Researches 2251-8444 15 3 2025 11 22 Contexts and factors of ISIS' decline: domestic, regional and international Contexts and factors of ISIS' decline: domestic, regional and international 221 239 244916 10.22034/irr.2026.585278.2865 FA Mohammadreza Bakhtiari Department of Political Science,, ZAH.C.,, Islamic Azad University, Zahedan, Iran. Ahmadreza Taheri Department of Political Science, ZAH.C., Islamic Azad University, Zahedan, Iran. Maryam Pooya , Department of History, Velayat Iranshahr University, Iranshahr, Iran. Journal Article 2026 06 06 The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, also known as ISIS, has had a major impact on regional developments in the Middle East in the post-Arab Spring era, and in particular on the internal developments in Iraq and Syria. However, it seems that the Islamic State has suffered a fundamental decline to the point where it has lost the ability to influence a significant area of its former territories. In this regard, given the importance of the issue, this study seeks to explain the context and factors affecting the decline of ISIS at the level of the Middle East security complex. The findings of the study show that, at the domestic level, the crisis of legitimacy and the erosion of the caliphate discourse, inefficiency in governance and management of the territory, structural and organizational gaps in ISIS, social disintegration and isolation of ISIS from local society, and at the regional and international levels, the formation of multilateral military coalitions and the expansion of anti-ISIS operations, the destruction of ISIS's financial and economic networks, and international intelligence and security pressures are considered to be factors in the decline of the Islamic State. The research method in this study is descriptive-analytical and based on the qualitative method and the data collection method is library and internet resources. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, also known as ISIS, has had a major impact on regional developments in the Middle East in the post-Arab Spring era, and in particular on the internal developments in Iraq and Syria. However, it seems that the Islamic State has suffered a fundamental decline to the point where it has lost the ability to influence a significant area of its former territories. In this regard, given the importance of the issue, this study seeks to explain the context and factors affecting the decline of ISIS at the level of the Middle East security complex. The findings of the study show that, at the domestic level, the crisis of legitimacy and the erosion of the caliphate discourse, inefficiency in governance and management of the territory, structural and organizational gaps in ISIS, social disintegration and isolation of ISIS from local society, and at the regional and international levels, the formation of multilateral military coalitions and the expansion of anti-ISIS operations, the destruction of ISIS's financial and economic networks, and international intelligence and security pressures are considered to be factors in the decline of the Islamic State. The research method in this study is descriptive-analytical and based on the qualitative method and the data collection method is library and internet resources.

https://www.iisajournals.ir/article_244916_5f0e335f2b54a5683a6d77866c196c89.pdf

The Iranian Association of International Studies International Relations Researches 2251-8444 15 3 2025 11 22 Analyzing the theoretical and functional dimensions of equitable balancing of legal remedies in the settlement of contractual disputes Analyzing the theoretical and functional dimensions of equitable balancing of legal remedies in the settlement of contractual disputes 241 265 245205 10.22034/irr.2026.582134.2855 FA Alireza Soltani PhD Candidate, Private Law, Bu.c., Islamic Azad University, Bushehr, Iran Gholamhossein Afras Department of Private Law, Bu.c., Islamic Azad University, Bushehr, Iran Abbas Barzegarzadeh Department of International Law, Bu.c., Islamic Azad University, Bushehr, Iran Journal Article 2026 05 18 In contemporary legal systems, the principle of fairness has gained significant attention as a fundamental concept in achieving contractual justice and adjusting legal relationships. This article aims to examine the position and function of the principle of fairness in Iranian contract law with a comparative view of English law, and to analyze its role in the interpretation and enforcement of contracts. The research method is descriptive–analytical and is based on library studies, including legal texts, doctrinal writings, statutes, and selected judicial practices. In this framework, the concept and theoretical foundations of fairness in law and Islamic jurisprudence are first explained, followed by an examination of its status in the Iranian legal system and English law. The findings indicate that although the principle of fairness in English law—particularly through the institution of equity—has a clear and influential role in moderating rigid legal rules, in Iranian law this principle can also be inferred and applied through Islamic jurisprudential foundations and legal doctrines such as justice, good faith, and the rule of no harm. However, its application in Iranian judicial practice is less explicit and systematic. Therefore, strengthening a fairness based approach in the interpretation and enforcement of contracts can contribute to achieving contractual justice, reducing legal disputes, and enhancing the flexibility of the legal system. In contemporary legal systems, the principle of fairness has gained significant attention as a fundamental concept in achieving contractual justice and adjusting legal relationships. This article aims to examine the position and function of the principle of fairness in Iranian contract law with a comparative view of English law, and to analyze its role in the interpretation and enforcement of contracts. The research method is descriptive–analytical and is based on library studies, including legal texts, doctrinal writings, statutes, and selected judicial practices. In this framework, the concept and theoretical foundations of fairness in law and Islamic jurisprudence are first explained, followed by an examination of its status in the Iranian legal system and English law. The findings indicate that although the principle of fairness in English law—particularly through the institution of equity—has a clear and influential role in moderating rigid legal rules, in Iranian law this principle can also be inferred and applied through Islamic jurisprudential foundations and legal doctrines such as justice, good faith, and the rule of no harm. However, its application in Iranian judicial practice is less explicit and systematic. Therefore, strengthening a fairness based approach in the interpretation and enforcement of contracts can contribute to achieving contractual justice, reducing legal disputes, and enhancing the flexibility of the legal system.

https://www.iisajournals.ir/article_245205_87323e1dcadc506cdb19aaf95c45b98f.pdf

The Iranian Association of International Studies International Relations Researches 2251-8444 15 3 2025 11 22 Comparative Analysis of the Legal Framework of Development-Oriented Assistance in the Islamic Republic of Iran and the People's Republic of China Comparative Analysis of the Legal Framework of Development-Oriented Assistance in the Islamic Republic of Iran and the People's Republic of China 267 290 246638 10.22034/irr.2026.584718.2863 FA Nader Mirzadeh Kohshahi Associate Professor, Department of Public Law, Faculty of Law and Political Science, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran. Javid Rostami PhD student in Public Law, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran. Journal Article 2026 06 02 Development-oriented assistance, as a strategic tool in international diplomacy, plays an important role in enhancing the status of emerging powers. This article examines the legal dimensions of development-oriented assistance by the Islamic Republic of Iran with a comparative look at the approach of the Chinese government. The main goal of the research is to explain the legal frameworks governing Iran's economic and technical cooperation with developing countries, especially in the West Asian and African regions. In this regard, principles such as respect for national sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, and mutual benefits that have been institutionalized in Iran's foreign policy are analyzed. Also, China's development-oriented model, which is based on infrastructure investment and "win-win", is analyzed as a leading model in international development law. The article shows, using a descriptive-analytical method, that although Iran and China seek a multipolar order in their macro approaches, their legal instruments and implementation mechanisms have substantial differences. While China focuses on large trade deals and new financial institutions, Iran relies on technical cooperation, technology transfer, and support for popular resistance. The study concludes that strengthening domestic legal frameworks and aligning with international standards can increase the effectiveness of Iran’s development assistance. Development-oriented assistance, as a strategic tool in international diplomacy, plays an important role in enhancing the status of emerging powers. This article examines the legal dimensions of development-oriented assistance by the Islamic Republic of Iran with a comparative look at the approach of the Chinese government. The main goal of the research is to explain the legal frameworks governing Iran's economic and technical cooperation with developing countries, especially in the West Asian and African regions. In this regard, principles such as respect for national sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, and mutual benefits that have been institutionalized in Iran's foreign policy are analyzed. Also, China's development-oriented model, which is based on infrastructure investment and "win-win", is analyzed as a leading model in international development law. The article shows, using a descriptive-analytical method, that although Iran and China seek a multipolar order in their macro approaches, their legal instruments and implementation mechanisms have substantial differences. While China focuses on large trade deals and new financial institutions, Iran relies on technical cooperation, technology transfer, and support for popular resistance. The study concludes that strengthening domestic legal frameworks and aligning with international standards can increase the effectiveness of Iran’s development assistance.

https://www.iisajournals.ir/article_246638_86ee1cf6e3fe33a80ce07e3e546c1703.pdf

The Iranian Association of International Studies International Relations Researches 2251-8444 15 3 2025 11 22 Investigating the Non-material Factors of Incompatibility in Iran-Saudi Arabia Relations Based on Constructivism Theory Investigating the Non-material Factors of Incompatibility in Iran-Saudi Arabia Relations Based on Constructivism Theory 291 214 251002 10.22034/irr.2026.593073.2885 FA Sajad Janparvar Department of Politics and International Relations, Ha.C., Islamic Azad University, Hamedan, Iran. 0009-0009-3599-9065 Ghasem Toraby Corresponding Author, Department of Politics and International Relations, Ha.C., Islamic Azad University, Hamedan, Iran. 0000-0002-5359-9390 Javad Ghiahshenas Benbazari Department of Politics and International Relations, Ha.C., Islamic Azad University, Hamedan, Iran. 0009-0006-6752-6324 Journal Article 2026 07 21 Despite the prominent and important position of both countries in the Islamic world and the Middle East, political and ideological differences, especially in the areas of identity and influence in the countries of the region, have caused deep disharmony.using constructivist theory, this research examines the role of non-material factors, such as identity, ideas, and attitudes, in the formation and perpetuation of these difference , and it raises the question of what are the roots of the incompatibility between these two countries, and what factors played a role in its formation? And what factors played a role in its formation? Based on the research question, it is hypothesized that identity conflicts and ideological conflicts between the two countries have had a significant impact on the emergence and continuation of the dispute. The research findings show that the identity factor and the elements built from it, including beliefs, attitudes, political interactions, etc., have had a great impact on relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia. In this study, the research method was descriptive-analytical and its data were collected through library studies. Despite the prominent and important position of both countries in the Islamic world and the Middle East, political and ideological differences, especially in the areas of identity and influence in the countries of the region, have caused deep disharmony.using constructivist theory, this research examines the role of non-material factors, such as identity, ideas, and attitudes, in the formation and perpetuation of these difference , and it raises the question of what are the roots of the incompatibility between these two countries, and what factors played a role in its formation? And what factors played a role in its formation? Based on the research question, it is hypothesized that identity conflicts and ideological conflicts between the two countries have had a significant impact on the emergence and continuation of the dispute. The research findings show that the identity factor and the elements built from it, including beliefs, attitudes, political interactions, etc., have had a great impact on relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia. In this study, the research method was descriptive-analytical and its data were collected through library studies.

https://www.iisajournals.ir/article_251002_7b6ca9e5defffac176ccce54d800d4c6.pdf