Researchers in the field of China's foreign relations have generally argued that the military conflicts between China and the Soviet Union in Zhenbao (Damansky) in March 1969 and the increasing threat of the Soviet Union have caused a change in the direction of China's foreign policy and the country's approach to the United States. However, newly published documents show that the Chinese started a border conflict with the Soviet Union. The question is what was Mao's purpose for this action? Did Beijing start border conflicts to improve its international diplomatic position? The documents show that Mao with the purpose of "attracting the attention and turning to the Americans" deliberately designed the military conflicts and the rapprochement between China and the United States was the result of Mao's grand strategy and diplomatic decision. In addition, the bitter lesson to the Soviet Union and the internal mobilization of the people for the development of the Cultural Revolution and Mao's concerns about it were other goals of this strategy. The main goal of the article is to understand how China and America are getting closer in the bipolar era. New documents from Chinese sources clearly show the important role of Chinese initiative in advancing Sino-American relations during 1969. In this research have used from Cold War history and Cold War studies magazines, whose articles have written based on Chinese first-hand documents
Introduction
The rapprochement between the People’s Republic of China and the United States in the late 1960s and early 1970s represents a pivotal moment in Cold War diplomacy. Conventional scholarly interpretations attribute this shift primarily to the escalating Soviet military threat, particularly after the Sino-Soviet border clashes at Zhenbao (Damansky) Island in March 1969. According to this view, Beijing, alarmed by Moscow’s assertiveness and potential nuclear threat, sought closer ties with Washington as a strategic counterbalance. However, newly available Chinese archival materials challenge this narrative. These documents indicate that Mao Zedong did not merely react to Soviet provocations but instead orchestrated limited border clashes to achieve broader political objectives. These included sending a calculated “bitter lesson” to Moscow, consolidating domestic unity in the wake of the Cultural Revolution, and, most importantly, facilitating rapprochement with the United States. This article offers a reinterpretation of Chinese elite decision-making in 1969, demonstrating how Mao strategically leveraged controlled conflict to reposition China within the bipolar international order.
 
Methodology
This article employs a historical-analytical approach, utilizing three primary sources of evidence:

Newly declassified Chinese archival documents, which reveal internal debates, Mao’s strategic calculations, and the intentional nature of the limited border clashes.
Cold War scholarship—including works by Chen Jian, Geoffrey Warner, Yang Kuisong, and Yafeng Xia—which integrates both Chinese and Western perspectives.
Comparative analysis of archival records, official publications, and contemporary media, to reconstruct the timeline of events and identify causal linkages between military confrontations and diplomatic overtures.

Through triangulation, this study uncovers how external diplomacy and internal political imperatives coalesced to shape Chinese foreign policy between 1969 and 1972.
 
Theoretical Framework  
 This study adopts a dual analytical framework, combining realism and constructivism. From a realist perspective, the Sino-Soviet split compelled China to reassess its strategic environment, identifying the Soviet Union—not the United States—as the principal threat. Rapprochement with Washington thus emerged as a rational balancing strategy. Simultaneously, constructivist insights illuminate the role of ideology and legitimacy. The Cultural Revolution had fractured China’s political system and undermined Party authority. By orchestrating conflict with the Soviet Union and engaging in symbolic gestures toward the United States, Mao reasserted ideological control and prepared the public for a significant foreign policy shift. The intersection of realist security imperatives and constructivist identity politics provides a more nuanced understanding of China’s diplomatic transformation
 
Discussion
The Zhenbao Island Incident
The March 1969 border clashes were not spontaneous. Evidence suggests Chinese forces deliberately prepared an ambush against Soviet troops under Mao’s directive for a controlled confrontation. The intent was political: to signal strength without escalating into full-scale war.
Domestic Mobilization
The clashes redirected societal focus toward national defense, restoring ideological cohesion in a post-Cultural Revolution context. Propaganda campaigns framed the confrontation as a moral victory over Soviet “revisionism,” reinforcing Party legitimacy and Mao’s personal authority.
The Four Marshals Study Group
Mao convened four senior military leaders—Chen Yi, Ye Jianying, Xu Xiangqian, and Nie Rongzhen—to assess the international balance of power. Their reports concluded that full-scale Soviet aggression was unlikely and advised cautious engagement with the United States. Their assessments laid the intellectual foundation for strategic realignment.
Symbolic Diplomacy
Mao complemented military maneuvers with symbolic gestures, including publicizing President Nixon’s inaugural address, hosting American journalist Edgar Snow in 1970, and initiating “Ping-Pong diplomacy” in 1971. These efforts helped mitigate public hostility and established informal diplomatic channels via Pakistan and Romania, ultimately enabling Kissinger’s secret visit and Nixon’s 1972 trip to China.
Ping-Pong Diplomacy and Diplomatic Opening
The invitation extended to the U.S. table tennis team in 1971 marked a significant break from two decades of antagonism. Coinciding with American trade policy liberalization and Nixon’s pro-engagement rhetoric, the event was widely publicized in China and prepared the public for normalization. It laid the groundwork for the Shanghai Communiqué and China's reentry into the global diplomatic arena.
Strategic Outcomes
Through this calculated strategy, Mao achieved multiple objectives:

Enhanced China’s bargaining position with both superpowers.
Reduced the likelihood of a Soviet pre-emptive strike.
Reestablished domestic cohesion following the Cultural Revolution.
Elevated China’s international standing, culminating in its 1971 admission to the UN and acquisition of a permanent Security Council seat.

 
Conclusion
This study concludes that the Sino-American rapprochement was not merely a defensive reaction to Soviet pressure but the result of Mao’s proactive grand strategy. By engineering controlled military confrontations and deploying symbolic diplomacy, Mao reshaped China’s foreign relations on his own terms.
Key Conclusions

Chinese strategic agency: Mao and Zhou Enlai actively manipulated Cold War dynamics to China’s advantage.
Domestic-foreign policy linkage: Foreign policy served as a tool for post-Cultural Revolution political consolidation.
Symbolic statecraft: Public gestures and narrative shifts were central to legitimizing policy change.
Strategic pragmatism: Ideological flexibility was employed to serve national security interests.

Suggestions for Future Research
Future studies could examine Soviet internal deliberations during the 1969 crisis, assess the long-term global consequences of the Sino-American thaw, and explore Chinese public perceptions of the rapprochement. Theoretically, the case provides a valuable lens through which to reconsider how secondary powers navigate bipolar systems to enhance strategic autonomy.