پژوهش های روابط بین الملل

پژوهش های روابط بین الملل

یکجانبه‌گرایی آمریکا و بحران مشروعیت نظام حل‌وفصل اختلافات سازمان جهانی تجارت

نویسندگان
حکیمه عبدی پور 1
سید فضل‌الله موسوی 2
احمد مومنی راد 3
1 دانشجوی دکتری، گروه حقوق، پردیس بین‌المللی کیش، دانشگاه تهران، جزیره کیش، ایران
2 نویسنده مسئول، استاد، گروه حقوق عمومی و بین‌الملل، دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران
3 دانشیار، گروه حقوق بین‌الملل، دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران
10.22034/irr.2026.254145
چکیده
نظام حل‌وفصل اختلافات سازمان جهانی تجارت یکی از مهم‌ترین سازکارهای تضمین اجرای قواعد چندجانبه تجاری و ایجاد ثبات و پیش‌بینی‌پذیری در روابط تجاری بین‌المللی به شمار می‌رود. بااین‌حال، مخالفت ایالات متحده با عملکرد و ساختار رکن استیناف و استمرار ممانعت از انتصاب اعضای جدید، به توقف عملی فعالیت این نهاد در دسامبر ۲۰۱۹ انجامید و بحران مهمی را در نظام حل‌وفصل اختلافات سازمان جهانی تجارت ایجاد کرد. پژوهش حاضر با هدف تحلیل نقش یکجانبه‌گرایی ایالات متحده در تشدید این بحران و بررسی پیامدهای انسداد رکن استیناف و کارکرد سازکار داوری موقت تجدیدنظر چندجانبه انجام شده است. روش پژوهش توصیفی ـ تحلیلی و مبتنی بر بررسی اسناد حقوقی سازمان جهانی تجارت، مواضع رسمی ایالات متحده و مطالعات علمی مرتبط با تحولات نظام حل‌وفصل اختلافات است. یافته‌های پژوهش نشان می‌دهد که اختلاف ایالات متحده با رکن استیناف صرفاً به نحوه رسیدگی به اختلافات محدود نبوده، بلکه موضوعاتی مانند حدود صلاحیت تفسیری، ایجاد تعهدات جدید از طریق تفسیر قضایی، ارزش آرای پیشین و رعایت مهلت‌های رسیدگی را نیز دربر گرفته است. انسداد فرایند انتصاب اعضای رکن استیناف در نهایت موجب ازکارافتادگی مرحله تجدیدنظر و گسترش پدیده «تجدیدنظر در خلأ» شد و بدین ترتیب، قابلیت اجرای آرای نظام حل‌وفصل اختلافات و اعتماد اعضا به کارآمدی آن با چالش مواجه گردید. در واکنش به این وضعیت، سازکار داوری موقت تجدیدنظر چندجانبه بر مبنای ماده ۲۵ تفاهم‌نامه حل‌وفصل اختلافات ایجاد شد که توانسته است برای اعضای مشارکت‌کننده امکان استمرار مرحله تجدیدنظر را فراهم کند؛ بااین‌حال، ماهیت موقت و مشارکتی آن مانع از جایگزینی کامل آن با یک نظام تجدیدنظر عمومی می‌شود. در نتیجه، رفع پایدار بحران مستلزم اصلاح فرایند انتصاب، تعیین روشن‌تر حدود صلاحیت تجدیدنظر و ایجاد سازکاری چندجانبه برای جلوگیری از انسداد نهادی است
کلیدواژه‌ها
یک‌جانبه‌گرایی ایالات متحده
سازمان جهانی تجارت
رکن استیناف
سازوکار موقت چندجانبه داوری استیناف

عنوان مقاله English

U.S. Unilateralism and the Legitimacy Crisis of the WTO Dispute Settlement System

نویسندگان English

Hakimeh Abdipour 1
Seyed Fazlollah Mousavi 2
Ahmad Momeni Rad 3
1 Ph.D. Student, Department of Law, Kish International Campus, University of Tehran, Kish Island, Iran
2 Corresponding author, Professor, Department of Public and International Law, Faculty of Law and Political Science, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran
3 Associate Professor, Department of International Law, Faculty of Law and Political Science, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran
چکیده English

The World Trade Organization dispute settlement system is one of the most important mechanisms for ensuring compliance with multilateral trade rules and promoting stability and predictability in international trade relations. However, the United States’ opposition to the functioning and structure of the Appellate Body and its continued blocking of the appointment of new members ultimately led to the effective suspension of the Body’s functioning in December 2019, thereby creating a major crisis in the WTO dispute settlement system. This study aims to analyze the role of U.S. unilateralism in intensifying this crisis and to examine the consequences of the Appellate Body impasse and the functioning of the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement. The research adopts a descriptive-analytical method based on an examination of WTO legal instruments, official U.S. positions, and scholarly studies addressing developments in the dispute settlement system. The findings indicate that the U.S. dispute with the Appellate Body was not limited to the manner in which disputes were adjudicated but also involved issues such as the scope of interpretive authority, the creation of new obligations through judicial interpretation, the status of previous rulings, and compliance with procedural deadlines. The blockage of the appointment process ultimately rendered the appellate stage inoperative and contributed to the proliferation of “appeals into the void,” thereby challenging the enforceability of dispute settlement decisions and confidence in the effectiveness of the system.

کلیدواژه‌ها English

U.S. Unilateralism
World Trade Organization
Appellate Body
Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement
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